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ARTICLES
ARTICLE III JUDICIAL POWER AND THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
*

ROGER J. PERLSTADT

Arbitrators determine facts and apply law to those facts to bindingly resolve
disputes between two or more parties, a task normally reserved for judges. The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes agreements to arbitrate disputes
enforceable, including disputes that would normally be heard by an Article III
judge, such as those arising under federal law or between parties of diverse
citizenship. Accordingly, disputes subject to an arbitration agreement brought
before a federal court for adjudication must instead, pursuant to the FAA, be
resolved by an arbitrator. Yet, while Article III ostensibly mandates that lifetenured and salary-protected judges decide such disputes, arbitrators—selected
and compensated by one or more of the parties—enjoy neither protection. A
literal reading of Article III thus suggests that sending federal disputes to nonArticle III arbitrators under the FAA is unconstitutional. Although courts
and scholars have roundly rejected Article III literalism and have adopted
various theories justifying non-Article III adjudication of Article III disputes,
whether the FAA is consistent with Article III has received little analysis. This
Article addresses that gap by applying the leading judicial and scholarly
theories of non-Article III adjudication to the FAA, ultimately determining that
none of them justify arbitration. While a legislative change could remedy the
tension between Article III and the FAA, this Article suggests that the better
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approach is simply to acknowledge the fundamental inconsistency of the FAA
with Article III while recognizing that parties may waive their constitutional
right to an Article III forum. Given that arbitration is a waiver of Article III
rights, however, this Article concludes that consent to arbitration must be
determined under the standards used to determine waiver of constitutional
rights generally, a fundamental shift from current FAA jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a typical employment discrimination case in which an
employee files suit in federal court alleging that she has been
discriminated against on the basis of her race or gender in violation
of federal anti-discrimination statutes. The employer responds by
pointing to an arbitration clause in an employment agreement or
employee handbook stating that any disputes between the employee
and employer will be resolved by binding arbitration. Under the
1
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the court must dismiss or stay the
litigation, and order the parties to arbitrate the claim pursuant to the
2
arbitration agreement. While the widespread use of predispute
1. Ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006).
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3

arbitration agreements and the Supreme Court’s consistent
4
endorsement of them may render this scenario common, something
quite remarkable is occurring: a dispute arising under federal law
and brought by one of the parties to an Article III court for
adjudication has been sent elsewhere —as required by an act of
Congress —for resolution by one or more arbitrators who are not
federal judges subject to Article III’s salary and tenure protections.
Indeed, the arbitrator may be selected and compensated by the
5
employer, one of the parties to the dispute. This raises the question
of whether the FAA is consistent with Article III’s ostensible
assignment of the task of resolving the dispute to the federal
judiciary.
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United
States in the Supreme Court and whatever lower federal courts
6
Congress decides to establish.
Although not defined in the
Constitution, judicial power can generally be understood as
encompassing the power to bindingly resolve a controversy between
two or more disputants by determining facts and applying the law to
7
those facts. Article III extends this power to certain specified cases
and controversies, including, among others, cases arising under
8
federal law and controversies between citizens of different states.
Importantly, Article III mandates that this power be exercised by
9
judges enjoying life tenure and salary protection. A literal reading of
Article III thus suggests that any entities authorized by Congress to
3. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1639–40 (2005).
4. See generally infra Part I.A–B.
5. See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (describing an arbitration program in which an employer unilaterally
established pool from which arbitrator must be selected); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that it is common practice for
employers in the securities industry to pay the arbitrators’ fees); RICHARD A. BALES,
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 109 (1997)
(describing an employee dispute resolution program in which the employer paid all
costs of arbitration exceeding a $50 filing fee).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”).
7. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
9. Id. § 1. Note that the Constitution does, however, contemplate state
courts —whose judges may lack life tenure and salary protections —exercising
judicial power over Article III disputes. For a discussion of state court adjudication
of federal disputes, see infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
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exercise the judicial power, i.e., to resolve disputes of the type
specified in Article III, must be Article III courts whose
determinations are made by judges with life tenure and salary
10
protection.
11
“Article III literalism,” as it has been dubbed, however, is simply
12
untenable in today’s legal landscape. For example, administrative
agencies, bankruptcy courts, courts-martial, and federal magistrate
judges, all exercise judicial power over Article III disputes without
tenure and salary protections. Both courts and commentators have
explored the contours of Article III and discussed when and how
13
non-Article III tribunals may resolve Article III disputes. Yet one
important type of adjudication of Article III disputes by non-Article
III bodies has received little analysis: private arbitration under the
FAA. Arbitrators exercise judicial power, determining facts and
applying law to those facts to bindingly resolve disputes between
14
private parties.
Such disputes often arise under federal law or
between parties of diverse citizenship —precisely the kinds of
disputes expressly covered by Article III. Yet arbitrators enjoy neither
the tenure nor the salary protections of Article III judges. Instead,
the parties to the dispute being arbitrated select and compensate the
arbitrator.
Determining whether the FAA is consistent with Article III is
important for at least two reasons. First, and most obviously,
legislative fidelity to the Constitution is important simply as part of
the tradition of American constitutionalism, the essence of which is
15
“the distinction between ordinary and fundamental law.” To the
10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 918–19 (1988) (describing “article III literalism” as
the view that Article III’s language creates a system in which “the only federal
tribunals that can be assigned to resolve justiciable controversies are ‘article III
courts’”).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 919–26; see also Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 625 (2007) (“[T]he letter of Article III is both wildly
impractical . . . and at war with history . . . .”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals,
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 656
(2004) (“[W]hile scholars continue to hold up a literal interpretation of Article III as
a goal to which the law might aspire, this approach suffers from serious problems of
institutional fit.”); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the
Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 228 (“Perhaps it is simply too late in
the day to suggest an absolute construction of article III; a distinguished—if largely
confused and unprincipled —line of cases has taken us well beyond that stage.”).
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. Christian G. Fritz, Fallacies of American Constitutionalism, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1327,
1332 (2004); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
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extent “ordinary” legislation (such as the FAA) is inconsistent with
the “fundamental” law of the Constitution, the legislation must
16
yield. As Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers, “[t]here
17
is no position which depends on clearer principles.”
Identifying
irreconcilable conflicts between legislation and the Constitution in
order to remedy the offending legislation, or, alternatively,
explaining why apparent conflicts are not irreconcilable, helps
maintain the proper functioning of American constitutionalism.
The other reason why it is important to determine whether
resolution of Article III disputes by non-Article III arbitrators is
consistent with the Constitution is the significant, and potentially
determinative, differences between Article III courts and arbitration.
Article III judges, who enjoy life tenure and salary protections, have
radically different incentives than non-Article III arbitrators retained
and paid for by the parties to a dispute. For example, because
arbitrators are chosen by and compensated by the parties, they are
competing with each other for dispute resolution business. Indeed,
one arbitration provider, JAMS, openly acknowledges this
competition, encouraging disputants to choose it over other
18
providers the disputants may have already selected. Consequently,
the incentive exists for arbitrators to favor parties they expect to
19
require arbitration services again in the future.
This kind of
(contrasting the Constitution as “superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means” with “ordinary legislative acts”).
16. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (“This theory [that an act of the
legislature repugnant to the constitution is void] is . . . one of the fundamental
principles of our society.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“No legislative act . . . contrary to the constitution can
be valid . . . . If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be
preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute,
the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 16, at 524.
18. See JAMS Arbitration Practice, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/adr-arbitration
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“If another arbitration provider was written into your
contract, call an experienced JAMS Case Manager to discuss having your case
administered by JAMS.”).
19. See BALES, supra note 5, at 128 (noting that the knowledge that an employer
is more likely than an employee to hire an arbitrator in the future may consciously
or subconsciously induce the arbitrator to favor the employer); Roger J. Perlstadt,
Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1983, 1986–87 (2002) (describing incentive of arbitrators in disputes between
Internet domain name registrants and trademark holders to find in favor of
trademark holders to attract their business in the future); Letter from Lori
Swanson, Att’y Gen. of Minn., to President, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (July 19, 2009),
available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf (describing the
findings of a year-long investigation of consumer arbitration providers including
that “an arbitrator is more likely to favor the party that is likely to send [it] future
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incentive, which understandably raises a concern of arbitrator bias in
20
favor of repeat players, is completely absent from Article III judges.
Further, despite this higher risk of bias, arbitrators are actually held
21
to a lower standard of impartiality than Article III judges.
Establishing that these differences between arbitrators and Article III
judges are actually outcome-determinative is a difficult empirical
22
question beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the
structural incentives of arbitrators, coupled with the lower
impartiality standard, are an important distinction between
cases”). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging,
67 L AW & C ONTEMP . P ROBS . 105, 126 (2004) (noting that “market competition . . .
may improve the quality of [arbitrators’] decisionmaking by inducing greater care”).
20. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 78 n.335 (1997) (“[A federal] judge, who is
appointed for life, may well be less subject to bias than an arbitrator, who relies on
parties and their lawyers for repeat business.”); Letter from Lori Swanson, supra note
19 (“This bias does not exist in a court, where the judge is not reliant on a dominant
player for his or her future income.”). Alexander Hamilton defended the salary
protections in Article III by suggesting that such protections help to eliminate bias
because “in the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence
amounts to a power over his will.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 16, at 531
(Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis omitted).
21. See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621
(7th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitration differs from adjudication, among many other ways,
because the ‘appearance of partiality’ ground of disqualification for judges does not
apply to arbitrators . . . .”); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,
991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Arbitrators are not held to the ethical standards
required of Article III judges . . . .”); Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173–
74 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The mere appearance of bias that might disqualify a judge will
not disqualify an arbitrator.”).
22. Empirical evidence comparing arbitration results to litigation results is
sparse and inconclusive. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 151–54 (Edward Brunet
et al. eds., 2006) (describing the difficulties in studying the differences between
arbitration and litigation); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad Are Mandatory
Arbitration Terms?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 777, 778–79 (2008). Introducing a
symposium aimed at “strengthening the empirical basis of the debate over
arbitration clauses,” Professor Ben-Shahar pointed to two conflicting empirical
claims made by the California Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit regarding
whether employees do better in arbitration or litigation against employers. The
California Supreme Court has noted that “[v]arious studies show that arbitration is
advantageous to employers . . . because it reduces the size of the award that an
employee is likely to get, particularly if the employer is a ‘repeat player’ in the
arbitration system.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat
Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60–61). Contrast the above with the
Seventh Circuit’s statement that “[e]mployees fare well in arbitration with their
employers —better by some standards than employees who litigate” Oblix, Inc. v.
Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Theodore Eisenberg &
Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44).
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arbitrators and Article III judges. This distinction suggests at least a
potential for decision-maker bias that is greater when a dispute is
resolved through arbitration rather than before an Article III judge.
Consequently, determining whether non-Article III arbitrators may
resolve Article III disputes has practical significance in addition to the
theoretical importance in preserving American constitutionalism.
Despite the importance of determining whether private arbitration
under the FAA is consistent with Article III, the issue has received
little attention from either courts or commentators. The Supreme
Court, notwithstanding a steady docket of FAA cases, has never fully
analyzed this Article III issue. The only opinion in which the Court
offered even a cursory analysis of the issue is an admiralty case from
23
1932, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus.
In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld enforcement of an arbitration agreement against an
24
Article III challenge. The Court noted that while Article III declares
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, it does not direct the court to
25
adopt any particular procedure. Thus, held the Court, Congress
could, in such cases, “give either party right of trial by jury, or modify
the practice of the court in any other respect that it deems more
26
conducive to the administration of justice.” What the Court failed
to explain, however, is how having the dispute bindingly resolved by
arbitrators was simply “modify[ing] the practice of the court in
27
[some] respect,” as opposed to a wholesale delegation of judicial
power to non-Article III actors. Marine Transit’s limited analysis was
contemporaneously described as a “summary disposal of the question
28
of constitutionality.”
Further, the decision has not been
subsequently cited by any of the lower federal courts addressing the
issue of whether the FAA is consistent with Article III. To the
contrary, those lower courts addressing the issue have — also with
little analysis—uniformly adopted what could be called waiver theory,
holding that enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Act
23. 284 U.S. 263 (1932); see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A
Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV.
949, 978 n.123 (2000) (“Remarkably perhaps, admiralty is the only context in which
the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the FAA.”).
24. Marine Transit, 284 U.S. at 279.
25. Id. at 278.
26. Id. at 278–79 (quoting Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 443, 460 (1851)).
27. Id.
28. Recent Case, Arbitration—Constitutionality of the United States Arbitration Act, 45
HARV. L. REV. 925, 926 (1932).
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presents no Article III problem because the right to have a dispute
29
resolved in an Article III forum may be waived by the disputants.
Like the courts, scholars too have largely failed to address the
30
FAA’s potential Article III problem. While there has been some
scholarly debate over how to reconcile arbitration with the Seventh
31
Amendment’s right to a jury, the Seventh Amendment question is
rendered moot by the potential Article III problem. The Seventh
Amendment does not apply to adjudications before non-Article III
32
tribunals, and thus, determining whether the FAA is consistent with
Article III makes the Seventh Amendment inquiry unnecessary. If
private arbitration under the FAA violates Article III, it is irrelevant
whether it also violates the Seventh Amendment; conversely, if private
arbitration under the FAA may proceed despite its non-Article III
status, the Seventh Amendment is simply not implicated. In addition,
29. See, e.g., Belom v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 284 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The
right to an Article III forum is not absolute and may be waived. Where an individual
consents to arbitration, he waives the right to an impartial and independent
adjudication.” (citation omitted)); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir.
1994) (“[A] person may, by contract, waive his or her right to [Article III]
adjudication . . . .” (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2)); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp.
719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“If defendants had wanted this dispute resolved by an
Article III judge and a jury, they could have refused to enter into an arbitration
clause in the Agreement.”). One lower federal court simply called an Article III
challenge to the Federal Arbitration Act “frivolous.” Sutter Corp. v. P & P Indus.,
No. 3:96-CV-1005-H, 1996 WL 622465, at *2 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 1996), rev’d on
other grounds, 125 F.3d 914 (5th Cir. 1997). That court offered no additional analysis
of the Article III challenge, citing only Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), for support, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court there did not address Article III concerns.
30. But see Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189,
1194–204 (2008) (rejecting waiver theory and proposing a “modified appellate
review theory”); Sternlight, supra note 20, at 78–80 (raising concerns about
arbitration’s potential Article III problem); see also Vicki Zick, Comment, Reshaping
the Constitution To Meet the Practical Needs of the Day: The Judicial Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 261–70 (1998) (arguing that the Federal
Arbitration Act represents an erosion of Article III, and rejecting waiver theory).
31. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 382
(2d ed. 2010) (citing debate over the course of several articles between Jean
Sternlight and Stephen Ware over waivers of Seventh Amendment jury rights in
arbitration).
32. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989) (“[I]f [an]
action must be tried under the auspices of an Article III court, then the Seventh
Amendment affords the parties a right to a jury trial whenever the cause of action is
legal in nature. Conversely, if Congress may assign the adjudication of a statutory
cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment poses no
independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.”); see also
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
460–61 (1977) (holding that the Seventh Amendment did not prohibit Congress
from assigning adjudicative powers to administrative fora); Colleen P. Murphy,
Note, Article III Implications for the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment to Federal
Statutory Actions, 95 YALE L.J. 1459, 1459–60 (1986) (“[I]n a non-Article III federal
forum . . . the Seventh Amendment simply does not apply.”).
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given that the vast majority of federal cases are resolved by dispositive
33
motion prior to ever reaching a jury, the practical significance of
protecting a Seventh Amendment right to a jury seems dwarfed by
the importance of protecting access to an Article III tribunal.
In a notable exception to the general scholarly silence on the
FAA’s potential Article III problem, Peter Rutledge has explicitly
rejected the waiver theory adopted by courts, offering as an
34
alternative what he calls “modified appellate review theory.”
Applying his modified appellate review theory to private voluntary
arbitration under the FAA, Professor Rutledge concludes that,
“[w]hile the issue is close,” such arbitration survives Article III
35
challenge.
This Article respectfully disagrees with Professor Rutledge’s
conclusion that the FAA is consistent with Article III under an
appellate review theory, and concludes that waiver theory offers the
only feasible way to justify arbitration in light of Article III. In doing
so, this Article fills a major analytic gap of waiver theory. The main
shortcoming of waiver theory as currently articulated is that it
proposes a solution (waiver) without ever grappling with whether a
problem (the inconsistency of the FAA with Article III) really exists.
This Article addresses that gap by asking whether the FAA actually
has an Article III problem that needs to be waived. It does so by
applying the leading judicial and scholarly theories of non-Article III
adjudication to the FAA. In ultimately endorsing waiver theory, this
Article also responds to the argument that Article III protects not
only personal rights to an Article III forum, but also structural
36
separation of powers concerns that are not waivable by disputants,
37
filling another gap in current waiver theory.
33. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 149 tbl.C4 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf (reporting 245,288 civil case terminations by court
action prior to trial and only 2254 jury trials for the twelve months ending September
30, 2011).
34. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1194–2004.
35. Id. at 1226.
36. See, e.g., id. at 1200.
37. The federal courts espousing waiver theory do not address the structural
separation of powers argument, and Professor Sternlight addresses it by simply
noting that parties may not waive their right to an Article III forum “where such
waiver would threaten the institutional integrity of the judicial branch.” Sternlight,
supra note 20, at 79. Professor Sternlight seems to suggest, however, that most, if not
all, arbitration threatens the judicial branch, id. at 79–80, in which case her
limitation on waiver would potentially eviscerate waiver theory. This Article argues
that private arbitration under the FAA does not implicate structural separation of
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of
those aspects of the FAA relevant to examining its potential
inconsistency with Article III. Part II sets out the judicial and
scholarly theories of adjudication by non-Article III tribunals and
demonstrates that none of those theories renders the FAA consistent
with Article III. Part III addresses potential solutions, ultimately
concluding that the best approach is simply to acknowledge the
fundamental inconsistency of the FAA with Article III, but to
recognize, as waiver theory suggests, that disputants may waive their
right to an Article III forum. Finally, this Article concludes that,
given that arbitration is a waiver of Article III rights, consent to
arbitration must be determined under the standards used to
determine waiver of constitutional rights generally, a fundamental
departure from current FAA jurisprudence.
I.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

Prior to the 1920s, disputes brought in court were not typically sent
to arbitration, regardless of any arbitration agreement between the
parties. Courts generally would not specifically enforce arbitration
agreements, refusing to stay litigation and compel arbitration of
38
disputes covered by such agreements. At best, courts would award
nominal damages against a party refusing to arbitrate for breach of
39
the agreement to arbitrate. Two rationales were invoked for this
40
First, it was
judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements.
argued that private parties could not “oust” courts of their
41
jurisdiction to resolve disputes.
Second, it was argued that
powers concerns, but only waivable individual rights to an Article III forum. See infra
Part III.B.1.
38. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (“The
federal courts— like those of the States and of England—have, both in equity and at
law, denied, in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to enforce
executory agreements to arbitrate disputes. They have declined to compel specific
performance or to stay proceedings on the original cause of action.” (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted)); STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 22 (discussing the
early history of judicial treatment of arbitration agreements and the “revocability
doctrine”); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION —
NATIONALIZATION —INTERNATIONALIZATION 20 (1992) (noting several weaknesses in
the early arbitration system such as lack of enforceability and the lack of specific
performance as a remedy for breach).
39. STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 22.
40. Id. at 22–23.
41. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“[Numerous
cases] show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction
conferred by law are illegal and void.”); see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942) (“[I]t became fashionable in the
middle of the 18th century to say that [arbitration] agreements were against public
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arbitration was simply ineffective at administering justice. In the
early part of the twentieth century, however, a reform movement
began gaining steam in an effort to reverse the non-enforcement of
43
arbitration agreements. A primary reason why reformers wanted
arbitration agreements to be made enforceable was their belief that
44
arbitration was less costly and more efficient than litigation.
In 1920, New York adopted an arbitration act making arbitration
45
agreements specifically enforceable. Following their success in New
York, the reformers wanted to create a uniform arbitration act that
would be adopted by every other state, and to have Congress pass a
46
federal arbitration act. The reason the reformers wanted a federal
act was because in the pre-Erie world in which they operated, even if
every state had an arbitration statute making arbitration agreements
valid, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction would not have to
47
enforce such agreements. As explained by the late Ian R. MacNeil:
[T]he most important fact in the legal background [against which
the FAA was presented to Congress] was the universal
understanding in the period from 1922 to 1925 that the
enforcement and nonenforcement of arbitration agreements and
policy because they ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of the courts.”). Kulukundis has been
described as “ the official history of arbitration in America. ” S TEPHEN K. H UBER
& MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (3d ed. 2011).
42. See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 14,065) (“[Arbitrators] are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the
principles of law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated cases . . . .
Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal, by which, however
honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights
of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?”); see also Kulukundis,
126 F.2d at 983 (“An effort has been made to justify this judicial hostility to the
executory arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitrations, if unsupervised by
the courts, are undesirable . . . .”).
43. See MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 25–47 (describing reform efforts from 1911 to
1925).
44. Id. at 29–30.
45. See STONE & BALES, supra note 31, at 29.
46. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101–02
(2006) (describing the efforts of Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer to promote
the use of arbitration).
47. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 275–76 (1926) (“Every one of the States in the Union might declare
[arbitration] agreement[s] to be valid and enforceable, and still in the Federal courts
[they] would remain void and unenforceable without this statute [the Federal
Arbitration Act].”); see also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings on Arbitration] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen)
(“Why do you have to have [an arbitration act] in the Federal law? . . . [T]he Federal
court will not be bound by any State statute.”); MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 132 (“The
practical concern advanced by Cohen and Dayton was a product of the rule of Swift
v. Tyson . . . as yet unmodified by [Erie].”).
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awards, particularly specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements, were matters of remedy. In that day, before Erie had
complicated such matters, remedial issues of this kind were
indisputably within the exclusive province of the court in which
enforcement was sought, the forum court. Moreover, the federal
courts plainly were hellbent on sticking to the proposition that
state arbitration statutes were not substantive law, and hence not
binding on the federal courts. This was their position, whether in
admiralty or in diversity cases, and whether or not interstate
48
commerce was involved.
49

Against this backdrop, the FAA was passed in 1925. Under the
FAA, arbitration agreements are deemed as enforceable as any other
50
contract.
If a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement is
51
brought to court, the court must stay the litigation and compel the
52
Thus, following
parties to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement.
enactment of the FAA, disputes brought to federal court could be
sent to non-Article III arbitration for adjudication. Interestingly, the
question whether such an act was consistent with Article III’s
allocation to federal courts of the power to bindingly adjudicate
disputes within Article III’s jurisdictional grant does not appear to
53
have been a concern of the FAA’s drafters.
Three important aspects of the FAA and its jurisprudence are
particularly relevant to determining whether private arbitration of
federal disputes is consistent with Article III. First, the Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted the FAA to cover a wide range of
potential disputes. Second, under current FAA jurisprudence,
whether parties have consented to arbitrate a dispute is determined
48. MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 109–10 (footnote omitted).
49. See generally id. at 84–101 (describing the enactment of FAA, then known as
the United States Arbitration Act).
50. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
51. Id. § 3.
52. Id. § 4.
53. If it were a concern of the drafters, it appears to have been well-hidden
because the issue does not seem to arise in the legislative history. See generally
MACNEIL, supra note 38, at 84–121 (describing enactment of the FAA and providing
a detailed analysis of the legislative history). In testimony before the House and
Senate Judiciary Subcommittees, Julius Cohen, one of the primary drafters of the
FAA, noted that the drafters had considered “one” constitutional provision, namely
the Seventh Amendment. See Joint Hearings on Arbitration, supra note 47, at 17
(statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“Now, there is one constitutional provision
which we considered . . . . The one constitutional provision we have got is that you
have a right of trial by jury.”). This statement suggests by implication that the
drafters did not consider the potential Article III problem, which, as discussed above,
is preliminary to the Seventh Amendment question. See supra notes 31–33 and
accompanying text.
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by ordinary contract principles, which disregard the subjective intent
of the parties. Third, judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely limited.
A. Scope of the Act
The FAA makes enforceable any “written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
54
transaction.” Thus, the FAA applies to disputes that (1) arise out of
transactions involving commerce, and (2) are covered by written
arbitration provisions. The Supreme Court has interpreted both
elements broadly, and the FAA thus covers a large number of
disputes otherwise falling within the coverage of Article III.
1.

Transactions covered
With respect to the first element — whether the dispute arises out
of a transaction involving commerce—the Supreme Court has read
the FAA to extend to the limits of Congress’s power to regulate
55
interstate commerce.
For example, the Court in Allied-Bruce
56
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson held that the FAA applied to a dispute over
allegedly ineffective residential pest control services because the
exterminator was a multi-state firm and used out-of-state materials in
57
performing the services.
While broadly reading the FAA to extend to the limits of
Congress’s commerce power, however, the Supreme Court has
narrowly read an express exception in the FAA that states that the act
shall not apply to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
58
interstate commerce.”
Six years after Allied-Bruce Terminix, the
59
Court held, relying on ejusdem generis, that the exception for
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
55. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995)
(reading section two as “extending the Act’s reach to the limits of Congress’
Commerce Clause power”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490–91 (1987)
(describing the Act as “a statute that embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce
Clause”).
56. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
57. Id. at 282.
58. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
59. Ejusdem generis is a cannon of statutory construction whereby a general phrase
following a list of specific persons or things will be interpreted to include only
persons or things of the same type as those listed. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594
(9th ed. 2009).
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“workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” included only
60
transportation workers, like seamen and railroad workers. Thus,
while a contract for residential pest-control services is considered a
transaction involving commerce such that a dispute arising out of
those services is covered by the FAA, an exterminator performing
those services is not deemed a worker engaged in interstate
commerce such that his employment contract is excluded from the
FAA’s coverage. Consequently, under the Court’s jurisprudence, the
FAA can apply to disputes arising out of all transactions within the
scope of Congress’s commerce power, including employment
agreements of all but a narrow class of transportation workers.
2.

Disputes covered
The second element establishing the scope of the FAA—whether
the dispute is covered by a written arbitration provision —also sweeps
broadly. Written arbitration provisions often cover “all disputes that
61
arise out of or in relation” to the contract or transaction at issue,
62
and are construed liberally. Courts have put few, if any, limitations
on the kinds of disputes covered by these broad boilerplate
63
agreements. Historically, one category of disputes not arbitrable,
even under a broad arbitration clause, was federal statutory claims.
64
In 1953, for example, the Court held in Wilko v. Swan that claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitrable, despite a
broadly worded agreement of the parties subjecting to arbitration
65
“[a]ny controversy arising between [them].”
Following Wilko,
60. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–19 (2001).
61. S TONE & B ALES , supra note 31, at 96; see, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967) (involving an arbitration clause stating
that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration”).
62. See, e.g, Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[D]ue regard must be given to the federal policy favoring
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in
favor of arbitration.”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration . . . .”).
63. See Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1999)
(discussing cases that “liberally” and “expansively” construe agreements to arbitrate
“[a]ll disputes arising in connection with this Agreement,” “any and all disputes
arising under the arrangements contemplated hereunder,” “[a]ll disputes arising in
connection with the present contract,” and “any dispute arising in connection with
the implementation, interpretation or enforcement” of an agreement (alterations in
original)).
64. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
65. Id. at 432 n.15, 433–35.
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courts found claims under other federal statutes, such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act, ERISA, Title VII, and the ADEA, not arbitrable
66
as well. Yet in the 1980s, the Supreme Court began backing away
67
from Wilko and started holding federal statutory claims arbitrable.
68
Ultimately, the Court expressly overturned Wilko, and, as it stated
shortly thereafter, “[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be
the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the
69
FAA.”
Between the Court’s broad reading of the FAA as covering all
transactions within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause power
(except employment contracts of a limited class of transportation
workers), and its failure to place any limits on the kinds of disputes
arising out of such transactions that can be arbitrated (including
federal statutory claims), a large number of disputes ostensibly falling
within the coverage of Article III can be made subject to arbitration
agreements enforceable by the FAA.
B. Consent to Arbitration
Given that a large number of Article III disputes can be made the
subject of an enforceable arbitration agreement, the question arises
whether any particular dispute, in fact, is. Arbitration under the FAA
70
is ostensibly a creature of consent. By the express terms of the Act, a
federal court may refuse to hear a dispute brought before it and,
instead, send it to arbitration only if the dispute is subject to an
71
“agreement” to arbitrate.
Under current FAA jurisprudence,
66. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451–53
(2011) (collecting cases).
67. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242
(1987) (holding claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO
arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614,
638–40 (1985) (holding Sherman Act claims arbitrable); see also McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 233 (“[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since
that time.”).
68. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was
incorrectly decided . . . .”).
69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
70. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion . . . .”); id. at 478 (“[T]he FAA does not require parties to
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so . . . .”).
71. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006) (stating that courts must stay litigation of “any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration . . . upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement”); id. § 4 (“[U]pon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall make an

PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

216

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2013 1:35 PM

[Vol. 62:201

whether such an agreement exists is determined by ordinary contract
72
Ordinary contract principles hold, however, that the
principles.
existence of an agreement is determined not by the subjective actual
intent of the parties, but by their objective overt actions, such as
73
signing a written document.
Thus, a party signing a contract
containing an arbitration provision will generally be bound by that
provision, even if the party was unaware of the provision and had no
74
actual intent to consent to arbitration. Similarly, an individual may
be bound by an arbitration provision unilaterally adopted by an
employer or service provider if that individual continues to work or
use the service, regardless of any subjective knowledge of or

order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement.”).
72. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009) (“[The
Federal Arbitration Act does not] alter background principles of state contract law
regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by
them).”); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . courts
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation
of contracts.”).
73. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208–10
(3d ed. 2004) (explaining objective theory of assent and noting that “courts
universally accept it today”); id. § 4.26, at 558 (“A party that signs an agreement is
regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain about not having
read or understood it . . . .”); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 113–14 (1996) (“The requirement to form a contract
is not that parties actually assent to its terms. The requirement is that they take
actions —such as signing their names on a document or saying certain words—that
would lead a reasonable person to believe that they have assented to the terms of the
contract.”).
74. See, e.g., Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 222–23 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding that a non-English speaking employee was bound by an Englishlanguage arbitration agreement he signed); Wash. Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Bailey, 364
F.3d 260, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2004) (enforcing an arbitration agreement despite an
illiterate party’s inability to understand the agreement he signed). While the Ninth
Circuit has adopted a heightened standard that would require subjective intent to
consent to arbitrate, Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.
1994) (“[W]e conclude that a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to . . . arbitrate
her claims if she has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration.”), it
applies only to a narrow class of statutory claims, Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 113 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Lai knowing waiver requirement
applies only to a comparatively small class of claims arising under Title VII or similar
laws . . . .”), and other circuit courts have not followed suit. See Morales, 541 F.3d at
224; Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005); Am.
Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002); Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997); Patterson v.
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997). Confusingly, while the
Sixth Circuit has stated that it has adopted a “knowing and voluntary” standard, it
appears not to require subjective intent. See Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc.,
507 F.3d 967, 971, 974 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding a “knowing and voluntary” waiver
where an employee simply attended an informational meeting and received a copy of
the employer’s dispute resolution policy).
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75

agreement to be bound by the provision.
Another example of how disputants may be bound to an
arbitration clause to which they did not subjectively assent is the
enforcement of arbitration agreements against non-parties. In Arthur
76
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause
traditional principles of state law allow a contract to be enforced by
or against nonparties to the contract through assumption, piercing
the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party
beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel,” there is no per se reason
77
why non-parties could not enforce an arbitration agreement. While
Arthur Andersen involved enforcement of an arbitration agreement by
a non-party to the agreement, lower courts have read that case as
authority supporting the enforcement of arbitration agreements
78
against non-parties. In addition, even before Arthur Andersen, some
79
courts had held that arbitration agreements could bind non-parties.
Thus, various courts have ruled that a husband asserting a wrongful
death suit was bound by an arbitration agreement between his
80
deceased wife and her insurer, a patient asserting a personal injury
75. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 972–74 (holding that by continuing to work, an
employee assented to her employer’s unilateral adoption of an arbitration program);
Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030–31 (S.D. Miss.
2000) (holding that by failing to close their account, depositors assented to an
arbitration clause unilaterally adopted by a bank in a revised deposit agreement; that
depositors did not read revised agreement was deemed irrelevant). Finding assent in
such cases is not without its critics. See, e.g., Seawright, 507 F.3d at 980 (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing a holding that an employee was bound to a unilaterally
adopted arbitration clause, noting that “[t]his is not how contracts are formed”);
Horton, supra note 66, at 456–59 (criticizing courts’ receptiveness to companies’ use
of nondescript bill stuffers to unilaterally add arbitration provisions to millions of
consumer contracts as “hard to square with the strong presumption against inferring
acceptance by silence”).
76. 556 U.S. 624 (2009).
77. Id. at 631 (quoting 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57:19, at 183 (4th ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
78. See, e.g., Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329,
333–34 (5th Cir. 2010) (reading Arthur Andersen as “concluding . . . that
nonsignatories to arbitration agreements . . . may sometimes be compelled to
arbitrate”); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, Civ No. 11-537 LH/CG, 2012
WL 112216, at *6–10 (D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Arthur Anderson in holding a
nonsignatory bound by an arbitration agreement), aff’d sub nom. Fundamental
Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, Nos. 12-2014, 12-2065, 2012 WL 5992259 (10th Cir.
Dec. 3, 2012).
79. See, e.g., Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“[N]onsignatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under ordinary
contract and agency principles.”); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435,
444 (3d Cir. 1999) (“When asked to enforce an arbitration agreement against a
nonsignatory, we ask whether he or she is bound by that agreement under traditional
principles of contract and agency law.”).
80. Drissi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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claim against a nursing home was bound by an arbitration agreement
81
between her mother and the home, and an employee injured at a
corporate leadership workshop was bound by an arbitration
82
agreement between his employer and the workshop provider. In
those cases, disputants seeking to bring claims in court were bound
by arbitration agreements to which they were not even parties, let
alone to which they had subjectively assented.
An additional aspect of federal arbitration law —the so-called
separability doctrine —further undermines any notion that a party
must subjectively consent to arbitration. The separability doctrine
was first endorsed by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
83
& Conklin Manufacturing Co. In that case, Prima Paint and F & C
had entered into a “Consulting Agreement” shortly after Prima
84
Paint’s purchase of F & C’s paint business. Under the Consulting
Agreement, Prima Paint would take over the servicing of former F &
C customers and pay F & C a percentage of receipts from those
customers in exchange for various consulting services from F & C and
85
a covenant not to compete. Prima Paint subsequently filed suit in
federal court, alleging that it had been fraudulently induced to enter
into the Consulting Agreement by F & C’s representations that it was
solvent and able to perform its contractual obligations, when in fact,
86
F & C was headed towards bankruptcy. F & C moved to stay the
litigation pending arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the
87
allegedly fraudulently induced Consulting Agreement. The issue
before the Court was thus “whether a claim of fraud in the
inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the federal
88
court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators.”
Holding that the fraudulent inducement claim would be submitted to
arbitration, the Court adopted the separability doctrine:
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself—an issue which goes to the “making” of the agreement to
arbitrate—the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the
[FAA] does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud
89
in the inducement of the contract generally.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007).
Parker v. Ctr. for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297, 299 (Colo. App. 2000).
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 403–04.
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Thus, under the separability doctrine, a party alleging that it had
been fraudulently induced to enter into a contract containing an
arbitration clause will be required to arbitrate its fraudulent
inducement claim, unless it alleges fraud specifically with respect to
the arbitration provision itself.
The separability doctrine undermines any notion that subjective
intent is required to consent to an arbitration agreement because if a
party is acting under the influence of a misrepresentation—even if
that misrepresentation does not pertain specifically to the arbitration
clause —it is not truly consenting. Stephen Ware analogizes Prima
Paint to a situation where a party signs a contract containing an
90
arbitration clause because someone is pointing a gun at his head.
While a signature obtained at gunpoint —like a fraudulently induced
signature — does objectively manifest assent to the terms of a
contract, it does not represent the actual subjective desire of the
signer. Applying the separability doctrine to a case in which a
plaintiff alleged that he signed a contract containing an arbitration
clause at gunpoint and allowing the arbitrator to decide whether to
enforce the contract “enforces a duty assumed through coerced, not
91
voluntary, consent.” Likewise, if a plaintiff was fraudulently induced
to enter a contract containing an arbitration provision, the
separability rule enforces a duty assumed through fraud, not true
knowing consent.
In sum, while arbitration is ostensibly a creature of consent, several
major aspects of current FAA jurisprudence —including determining
consent through contract law objective manifestation of intent
standards, enforcing arbitration agreements against non-parties, and
applying the separability rule —reject the idea that such consent must
represent the subjective, knowing intent of the parties.
C. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
The final aspect of FAA jurisprudence relevant to determining
whether it is consistent with Article III is judicial review of arbitration
awards. Under the FAA, judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely limited. The Act requires a court to issue an order
confirming an arbitration award upon the request of one of the
parties, unless the award is vacated or modified for one of seven
reasons specified in the FAA:
90. Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 22, at 88, 100–02.
91. Id. at 100.
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(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality or corruption in any of the
arbitrators;
(3) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the
rights of any party;
(4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(5) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or mistake in
describing persons or property in the award;
(6) The arbitrators made an award on a matter not submitted to
them;
(7) The award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the
92
merits.

These statutory grounds for modifying or vacating an arbitral
award provide for a much narrower review than that typically given by
an appellate court reviewing a lower court decision. Indeed, while
appellate courts review lower courts’ legal rulings de novo and factual
93
findings for clear error, the statutory grounds for modification or
vacatur of arbitral awards allow for review essentially only of the
arbitrators’ conduct, not of the substance of the arbitrators’ factual or
94
legal determinations on the merits of the dispute. As one court has
explained:
[T]he scope of judicial review [of] an arbitrator’s decision is
among the narrowest known at law because to allow full scrutiny of
such awards would frustrate the purpose of having arbitration at
all—the quick resolution of disputes and the avoidance of the
expense and delay associated with litigation. Indeed . . . in
reviewing such an award, a district or appellate court is limited to
determin[ing] whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to

92. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2006).
93. See 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2588, at 443–57 (3d ed. 2008).
94. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (“[I]t
would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds [for
review in the FAA] to the point of evidentiary and legal review generally.”);
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS § 7.03,
at 494 (2d ed. 2006) (“[T]he grounds on which courts review arbitration awards
are much narrower than the grounds on which appeals courts review decisions of
trial courts . . . .”); HUBER & WESTON, supra note 41, at 427 (“[T]hese grounds [for
review of arbitral awards under the Federal Arbitration Act] are narrower than the
standards for appellate review in a judicial case where a court reviews a lower court’s
legal rulings de novo and factual findings for clear error.”); Stephen Wills Murphy,
Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 892
(2010) (“Conspicuously absent from [the Federal Arbitration Act’s judicial review
provisions] is the ability of the court to intervene and vacate an award for arbitrators’
substantive errors of law or fact.”).
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do—not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but
95
simply whether they did it.

In addition to the narrow statutory grounds for modifying or
vacating an arbitration award, however, courts have historically —at
least prior to 2008 —endorsed various non-statutory grounds for
96
vacating an arbitration award. Chief among these was the ground
97
that the arbitrator’s decision was in “manifest disregard” of the law.
Under the manifest disregard standard, a court may vacate an arbitral
award where the arbitrator “refus[ed] to apply a clearly defined legal
98
principle known to the arbitrator to be controlling.”
Manifest
disregard of the law means something more than just a mistaken or
99
erroneous determination or application of law, and thus review for
manifest disregard is less searching than de novo review for
correction of legal errors. While other non-statutory grounds for
vacating arbitral awards have been endorsed by various courts, like
manifest disregard they are rather limited grounds for review and
none of them adopt an appellate-court-like de novo review of legal
100
determinations.
95. Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, as a
practical matter, reviewing an arbitral award on the merits can be difficult given that
arbitrators are oftentimes not required to issue written opinions. See BALES, supra
note 5, at 133 (“The securities industry arbitration rules require the arbitrator to
issue a written award, which does little more than state who shall receive what and
when the individual shall receive it. The arbitrator is not required to issue an opinion
giving reasons for the award.” (footnote omitted)); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 558 (6th ed. 2012) (“[F]rom a
practical perspective, the review of commercial arbitration awards on the merits is
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. The commonplace practice domestically
has been to render awards without legal explanation or with only a limited
explanation. Additionally, informal arbitral proceedings usually are not codified in a
verbatim transcript.”).
96. See Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of
the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 146–47 (2011) (explaining that historically
courts have vacated arbitration awards for several reasons, including making “some
obvious mistake of law,” or committing “fraud, accident, mistake, or illegality”).
97. See id. at 158–59 (noting that “by 1999 every circuit court of appeals had
adopted the manifest disregard standard”).
98. MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of
Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 413 (2010) (quoting Jeffrey
W. Sarles, US Courts Wrestle with “Manifest Disregard” After Hall Street, MAYER BROWN
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/US-Courts-Wrestle-withManifest-Disregard-after-IHall-StreetI-08-10-2009). See generally Stephen L. Hayford,
Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA.
L. REV. 731, 774–78 (1996) (explaining the manifest disregard standard).
99. See Hayford, supra note 98, at 776–77; Sims & Bales, supra note 98, at 413.
100. See generally Hayford, supra note 98, at 778–98 (explaining non-statutory
grounds for vacating arbitral awards including that the award is in direct conflict with
public policy, is arbitrary and capricious, is completely irrational, or fails to draw its
essence from the parties’ underlying contract); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of
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In 2008, however, the Supreme Court appeared to put the kibosh
on the use of non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitral awards when
101
it decided Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. While Hall Street
did not involve a judicially-created non-statutory review standard such
as manifest disregard, but rather a contractually-created review
standard that the parties had written into their arbitration
102
agreement, the Court stated that “we granted certiorari to decide
whether the grounds for vacatur and modification provided by . . .
103
the FAA are exclusive [and] [w]e agree . . . that they are.” Despite
the apparently clear language of the Court that the statute provides
the exclusive grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitral awards,
however, lower courts’ interpretations of Hall Street have been mixed.
For example, while some circuits have read Hall Street as rejecting
non-statutory grounds for modification or vacatur of arbitral
104
awards, at least one circuit has held that non-statutory grounds such
105
as manifest disregard remain permissible.
A third, middle-ground
position adopted by some circuits is that while Hall Street may have
held that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an
arbitral award, manifest disregard survives as a judicial gloss on the
express FAA ground allowing vacatur where an arbitrator has

Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/images
/pdfs/817.pdf (characterizing manifest disregard, completely irrational, and against
public policy as “equivalent”).
101. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
102. The arbitration agreement between the parties in Hall Street provided that
“[t]he Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the
arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.” Id. at 579.
103. Id. at 581 (citation omitted).
104. E.g., Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010);
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); RamosSantiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); see also
Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Hall Street
for the proposition that “[a]n arbitral award may be vacated only for the reasons
enumerated in the FAA”).
105. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418–19 (6th Cir.
2008) (“In Hall Street Assocs., the Supreme Court significantly reduced the ability of
federal courts to vacate arbitration awards for reasons other than those specified in
[the FAA], but it did not foreclose federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest
disregard of the law . . . . Accordingly, this Court will follow its well-established
precedent here and continue to employ the ‘manifest disregard’ standard.” (citation
omitted)). Various commentators have endorsed this view that the use of nonstatutory vacatur grounds survives Hall Street. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 100, at 13
(“On the narrow reading of Hall Street that I propose, the FAA section 10 standards
are ‘exclusive’ in the sense that private parties may not change or expand them by
contract. Such a holding is fully consistent with the continued vitality of judiciallycreated vacatur doctrines.”); Sims & Bales, supra note 98, at 431–33 (arguing that
manifest disregard survives Hall Street).
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106

exceeded its powers.
Adding to the confusion is the Supreme
Court’s comment in a subsequent case that “[w]e do not decide
whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the
107
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth [in the FAA].”
Nevertheless, at best, while some circuits may continue to allow
manifest disregard or other originally non-statutory grounds for
vacatur, as noted above, such grounds call for less-than-appellatecourt-like de novo review of legal determinations. The relevant point
here is that judicial review of arbitral awards is quite limited.
II. THE FAA’S ARTICLE III PROBLEM
As explained above, under the FAA, a broad range of disputes
ostensibly assigned to Article III courts can be sent instead to
arbitration with extremely limited judicial review. This Part explores
whether sending such disputes to arbitration is consistent with Article
III, first by asking whether a conflict actually exists between the FAA
and Article III, and second, after finding that one does, by
determining whether any of the current judicial or scholarly
approaches to non-Article III adjudication can resolve the conflict.
A. Arbitrators and Judicial Power
Article III allocates the exercise of judicial power over Article III
108
disputes to life-tenured and salary-protected judges,
which
arbitrators are not. If resolution of Article III disputes by arbitrators
not subject to Article III tenure and salary requirements is the
106. E.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.
2009) (“[W]e conclude that, after Hall Street Associates, manifest disregard of the law
remains a valid ground for vacatur because it is part of § 10(a)(4).”); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Other courts]
think that ‘manifest disregard,’ reconceptualized as a judicial gloss on the specific
grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA, remains a valid ground for
vacating arbitration awards. We agree with those courts . . . .” (citations omitted)),
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). This was the position of the Seventh
Circuit even before Hall Street. See Wise v. Wachovia Secs., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 268
(7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have defined ‘manifest disregard of the law’ so narrowly that
it fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory ground [of the
FAA].”). In addition, while the Fourth Circuit has stated that manifest disregard
survives Hall Street, it has not decided whether it survives as a judicial gloss on section
10 or as a non-statutory ground. Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483
(4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we find that manifest disregard continues to exist either
as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which
of the two it is . . . .”).
107. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (citation omitted).
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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exercise of judicial power over such disputes, there is a potential
conflict between Article III and the FAA. Conversely, if arbitrators do
not exercise judicial power, the FAA does not have an Article III
problem.
While Article III does not define “judicial power,” the term can be
understood as the power to bindingly resolve a controversy between
two or more disputants by determining facts and applying the law to
109
those facts.
Indeed, Blackstone’s Commentaries, with which the
110
drafters of Article III were no doubt familiar, defines “judicial
power” as the power “to examine the truth of the fact, to determine
the law arriving upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have
111
been done, to ascertain and by its officers to apply the remedy.”
Determining facts, applying the law to those facts, and ascertaining a
112
remedy to be applied to the parties is precisely what arbitrators do.
For example, one arbitration provider, the National Arbitration
Forum, describes its arbitration services as “very similar to court” and
states that “[i]n a FORUM arbitration, two disputing parties bring
their dispute before a legal expert who renders a decision in favor of
113
one of the parties based on the law and applicable rules.”
109. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 924 (defining “judicial power”
as “[t]he authority vested in courts and judges to hear and decide cases and to make
binding judgments on them; the power to construe and apply the law when
controversies arise over what has been done or not done under it”); see also Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (“[A] ‘judicial Power’ is one to
render dispositive judgments.” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990))); Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among
Friends?—Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1052–53 (1998) (“If
[application of law to facts] is done for opposing parties by a neutral with the
purpose of authoritatively pronouncing the law in officially resolving a dispute
between these opponents, then it is an exercise of the judicial power.”).
110. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 744–45 (1976) (noting that “a
number of [Blackstone’s] readers and at least one of his former students were
delegates to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention,” and that his
Commentaries “acted as a convenient reference work”); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension
as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 614–15 (2009) (noting that Blackstone was
one of the two “most influential English sources to which the Framers turned in
shaping American law”).
111. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25.
112. One could argue that a relevant distinction between arbitration and judicial
power is that while a judicial decision can invoke state power to enforce the decision
(say by having a sheriff assist with collecting assets from a recalcitrant losing party),
an arbitration award alone may be insufficient to do so. See, e.g., FIA Card Servs.,
N.A. v. Weaver, 62 So. 3d 709, 712 (La. 2011) (“For an arbitral award to be made
enforceable by law, it must first be confirmed by a court.”). Given that an arbitration
award can be turned into an enforceable judgment with extremely limited judicial
review, see supra Part I.C, such a distinction seems a weak basis to argue that
arbitrators do not exercise judicial power.
113. FAQ: How is the FORUM Similar to a Court?, NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM,
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Bindingly resolving a dispute by applying law to determined facts in
this way is the exercise of “judicial power” and, indeed, arbitrators
114
are often characterized as private judges.
One could argue that arbitration is not the exercise of judicial
power because arbitration is merely a glorified form of settlement.
Certainly there is no Article III problem where two parties to a
dispute that falls within Article III jurisdiction simply settle the
dispute. While settlement represents one kind of resolution of an
Article III dispute, such self-resolution does not involve the exercise
of “judicial power” over the dispute. No third-party entity is
determining facts, applying law to those facts, and issuing a resolution
binding on the disputants. Although a settlement agreement may be
binding as a matter of contract, it is hard to argue that two parties
who have agreed to settle a dispute have exercised “judicial power”
in doing so. As Craig Stern has noted, the word “judicial” derives
from the Latin jus dicere (“to speak the law”), and “judicial power” is
thus “an official ‘speaking of the law’ to other parties so as to resolve a
115
dispute between them.”
While parties to a dispute may resolve it
through anything from a handshake to a complex settlement
agreement, it is hard to argue that when the parties themselves have
negotiated a resolution (rather than having one bindingly imposed
on them by a third-party adjudicator) that they have exercised
“judicial power.” As soon as a third party is brought in to render a
http://www.adrforum.com/faq.aspx?faq=872 (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
Other
arbitration providers describe arbitration similarly. See, e.g., Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/arb_med (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“Arbitration is the
submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision,
known as an ‘award.’”); Arbitration Definition, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitrationdefined (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“The arbitrator reads briefs and documentary
evidence, hears testimony, examines evidence and renders an opinion on liability and
damages in the form of an ‘award of the arbitrator’ after the hearing.”); Arbitration
Overview, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Overview
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (“[Arbitrators] read the pleadings filed by the parties, listen to
the arguments, study the documentary and/or testimonial evidence, and render a
decision.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 59, at 119 (defining “arbitration”
as “[a] method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties . . .
whose decision is binding”).
114. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854) (“Arbitrators are
judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them . . . .”); W.
Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1091, 1097 (2012) (“[T]he service arbitrators provide to litigants—binding,
third-party dispute resolution—is essentially the same as that provided by judges.”).
For example, Anheuser-Busch’s employee dispute resolution system states that “[t]he
arbitrator essentially substitutes for a judge and jury who might decide the case in a
court setting.” Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 2006)
(quoting Anheuser-Busch Dispute Resolution Program Policy Statement).
115. Stern, supra note 109, at 1053–54 (emphasis added).
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binding adjudication, however, even if brought in voluntarily by the
parties, that third party is exercising judicial power, and thus
potentially encroaching on Article III’s allocation of such power to
116
Article III courts.
One could also make a textual argument that even if arbitrators
bindingly adjudicating Article III disputes are exercising judicial
power, they are not exercising the judicial power “of the United States,”
which is what Article III allocates to life-tenured and salary-protected
117
judges. The argument would be that because private arbitrators are
not federal officers and part of some federal governmental entity,
whatever judicial power they are exercising is not that of the United
States. But saying that a body is not exercising the judicial power of
the United States because it is not a federal governmental entity
misses the point. The judicial power of the United States is the power
to bindingly resolve disputes of the kind set out in Article III. If an
entity is exercising that power, it is exercising the judicial power of
the United States, whether or not it is a federal governmental entity.
Indeed, state courts adjudicating Article III disputes are exercising
118
the judicial power of the United States.
Similarly, though
arbitrators, like state court judges, are not United States officers, they
are nonetheless exercising the judicial power of the United States
when they adjudicate Article III disputes. While state court exercise
of such judicial power is consistent with Article III because such
resolution was clearly contemplated by the Framers and assumed to

116. Professor Rutledge offers two additional reasons why arbitration should not
be conflated with settlement. First, he argues that arbitration involves less party
autonomy than settlement because unlike in settlement, parties to arbitration are
bound to the bargain before they know its substantive terms. Second, he argues that
greater judicial scrutiny is given to settlement agreements than to arbitration awards.
Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1199–200.
117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
118. See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2007)
[hereinafter Pfander, Federal Supremacy] (arguing that state courts adjudicating
federal disputes are essentially inferior federal tribunals, which Congress has the
power to constitute under Article I, § 8). One could argue that Professor Pfander’s
inferior tribunal account could be applied to arbitration, i.e., that an arbitral forum
is simply an inferior federal tribunal constituted by Congress (through enactment of
the Federal Arbitration Act) pursuant to its Article I, § 8 power. A key element of
Professor Pfander’s inferior tribunal theory, however, is the inferiority requirement,
which includes appellate review by the Article III judiciary. See Pfander, supra note
12, at 689 (“[T]he inferiority requirement creates a foundational rule under which
all tribunals must answer to the head of the Article III judiciary.”). As discussed
below, however, infra Part II.B.2, judicial review by Article III courts of arbitral awards
is insufficient to justify arbitrators’ exercise of judicial power.
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be part of the constitutional structure, however, no such historical
or structural justification exists to support arbitrators’ similar
adjudication of Article III disputes.
Because arbitration is not simply a glorified form of settlement,
and arbitrators bindingly resolve disputes by applying law to facts they
determine, arbitrators exercise judicial power. Further, to the extent
arbitrators exercise such judicial power over disputes falling within
the coverage of Article III, they are exercising the judicial power of
the United States, which Article III assigns exclusively to life-tenured
and salary-protected judges. Thus, resolution of such disputes by
arbitrators pursuant to the FAA is in tension with the literal mandate
of Article III.
B. The FAA and Current Theories of Non-Article III Adjudication
While Article III literalism has been rejected by both courts and
scholars, a uniform approach to determining when adjudication of
Article III disputes by non-Article III bodies is constitutional has not
emerged. The Supreme Court has proposed both a categorical
exceptions approach and a balancing test, while scholars have settled
on what is termed appellate review theory. As discussed below,
however, none of these approaches render the FAA consistent with
Article III.
1.

Supreme Court approaches: Categorical exceptions and balancing
Supreme Court precedent over the past thirty years on the
constitutionality of adjudication of Article III disputes by non-Article
III bodies has been less than illuminating. In Northern Pipeline
120
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a plurality of the Court
endorsed a categorical approach to determining when Congress
could constitutionally authorize the exercise of federal judicial power
119. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, supra note 118, at 197–98 (“The Madisonian
Compromise resulted in the adoption of language in Article III that empowers, but
does not require, Congress to create lower federal courts. Convention holds that
Congress has broad freedom either to establish lower federal courts, or to leave
matters to the state courts instead.” (footnote omitted)); see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 282–83
(6th ed. 2009) (“[S]ince [under the Madisonian Compromise and the structural
logic of Article III] Congress need not create any lower federal courts at all, state
courts must be regarded as enjoying constitutional parity with the lower federal
courts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 16, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]n
every case in which [state courts] were not expressly excluded by the future acts of
the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which
those acts may give birth.”).
120. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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121

by non-Article III tribunals. Specifically, Justice Brennan’s opinion
for the Court held that there were “three narrow situations” not
subject to the constitutional command that judicial power be
122
exercised only by Article III courts.
These three exceptions were
territorial courts, courts-martial, and cases involving the adjudication
of “public rights,” defined as those cases in which the government is
123
a party.
In addition to these three exceptions to Article III, Justice
Brennan’s opinion also stated that certain adjudicatory functions
could be delegated to non-Article III “adjuncts” of Article III courts,
so long as “the essential attributes of the judicial power” were
124
retained by the Article III court. Justice Brennan referred to Crowell
125
126
v. Benson and United States v. Raddatz as two cases in which use of
non-Article III bodies had been justified as adjuncts to Article III
127
courts. In Crowell, the Court upheld adjudication of worker injury
128
claims by the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission,
and in Raddatz, the Court upheld the use of non-Article III magistrate
129
judges to decide motions to suppress evidence in criminal matters.
In both Crowell and Raddatz, the essential attributes of judicial power
remained in Article III district courts, because the district courts
130
retained the ultimate power to decide the controversy.
While
Justice Brennan refused to call adjuncts an “exception” to Article
121. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 63–64.
123. Id. at 63–70.
124. Id. at 76–77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
125. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
126. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
127. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77 (plurality opinion).
128. 285 U.S. at 64–65.
129. 447 U.S. at 686.
130. In Crowell, while factual findings of the Commission were generally
considered final, rulings on questions of law were not, and “full opportunity [was]
afforded for their determination by the Federal courts.” 285 U.S. at 45–46. Thus,
the essential attributes of judicial power remained in Article III courts. See id. at 54
(“[T]he reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of law provides
for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in this class of cases.”). In
Raddatz, the Court noted that “Congress has provided that the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations shall be subjected to a de novo determination ‘by the
judge who . . . then exercise[s] the ultimate authority to issue an appropriate
order.’” 447 U.S. at 681–82 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-625, at 3
(1976)); see also id. at 682 (“[T]he authority—and the responsibility—to make an
informed, final determination . . . remains with the [Article III district court] judge.”
(quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted))); id. at 686 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Congress has vested in Art. III
judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and
impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory
control over the assistants’ activities.”).
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III, the result of the Northern Pipeline plurality was that it established
a set of four categories in which non-Article III bodies could
constitutionally exercise judicial power: territorial courts, courtsmartial, public rights cases, and adjuncts to Article III courts.
Shortly after Northern Pipeline, however, the Court expressly rejected
this categorical approach to analyzing the proper use of non-Article
132
III tribunals. In Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the
Court stated that:
[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be assessed by
reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article
III. This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the principle that practical
attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
133
categories should inform application of Article III.

In rejecting Northern Pipeline’s “doctrinaire reliance on formal
categories,” Schor instead established a balancing test focusing on
three main factors to determine whether a non-Article III body was
impermissibly exercising judicial power, specifically:
[1] [T]he extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial
power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts,
[2] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and
[3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
134
requirements of Article III.

In its most recent opinion on the subject, however, the Court
appears to have changed course once again, rejecting Schor’s
balancing test and returning once again to the categorical approach
135
of Northern Pipeline. In Stern v. Marshall, the Court addressed
whether adjudication of a common law tort claim by a bankruptcy
court (whose judges do not enjoy Article III tenure and salary
136
protections) was constitutional.
In analyzing the issue, the Court
did not use the balancing test from Schor, but rather asked whether
137
the case fell within the public rights exception of Northern Pipeline,
131. See N. Pipeline 458 U.S. at 77 n.29 (plurality opinion) (“Congress’ power to
create adjuncts and assign them limited adjudicatory functions is in no sense an
‘exception’ to Art. III.”).
132. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
133. Id. at 847–48 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id. at 851.
135. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
136. Id. at 2600–01.
137. Id. at 2611–15.
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or, alternatively, whether bankruptcy courts could properly be
138
Stern suggests at
considered adjuncts of Article III district courts.
least an implicit endorsement of Northern Pipeline’s categorical
approach. Indeed, Justice Scalia, one of five justices in the majority,
wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing his support of Northern
139
Pipeline’s categorical approach,
and the four justice minority
140
lamented the Court’s reliance on Northern Pipeline over Schor.
While seemingly reviving the Northern Pipeline categorical
exceptions approach, the Court in Stern did alter one aspect of that
approach: it rejected Northern Pipeline’s limitation of public rights
141
cases to cases to which the government was a party. Instead, it held
that public rights cases (which can be adjudicated by non-Article III
bodies under the categorical exceptions approach) are those in
which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme or
in which adjudication of the claim by the non-Article III tribunal is
142
essential to some regulatory objective. “In other words,” the Court
stated, “it is still the case that what makes a right ‘public’ rather than
private is that the right is integrally related to particular federal
143
government action.”
The Court recognized, however, that this
departure from Northern Pipeline’s bright-line rule that public rights
cases are those to which the government is a party to a blurrier
“integrally related” test could fail to provide concrete guidance in
144
particular cases.
Can either of the Supreme Court’s approaches to non-Article III
tribunals reconcile the FAA with Article III? Under the categorical
exceptions approach, exercise of judicial power by a non-Article III
body is constitutional in four situations, three of which are based on
138. Id. at 2618–19.
139. Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]n my view an Article III judge is
required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical
practice to the contrary. For that reason . . . I agree that Article III judges are not
required in the context of territorial courts, courts-martial, or true ‘public rights’
cases.”). By “true ‘public rights’ cases,” Scalia means, as Northern Pipeline held, cases
arising between the government and others. See id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
140. See id. at 2622 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In my view, the majority . . . overstates
the importance of an analysis that did not command a Court majority in Northern
Pipeline and that was subsequently disavowed . . . [a]nd it fails to follow the analysis
that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a
kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory
authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III.” (citing
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986))).
141. Id. at 2613–14 (majority opinion).
142. Id. at 2613.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2615.
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the nature of the tribunal, and one of which is based on the nature of
145
Thus, under this approach, courts-martial, territorial
the dispute.
courts, and adjuncts to an Article III court may all exercise judicial
146
power over Article III disputes.
In addition, other non-Article III
bodies may also adjudicate Article III disputes involving public
147
rights.
Arbitration under the FAA is clearly neither a court-martial nor a
territorial court. Further, it is hard to argue that arbitrators act as
adjuncts to Article III courts. As noted above, under the adjunct
categorical exception, certain adjudicatory functions can be
delegated to non-Article III adjuncts of Article III courts so long as
“the essential attributes of the judicial power” are retained by the
148
Article III court.
In the context of arbitration, however, no
attributes of the judicial power are retained by an Article III court
when an Article III dispute is sent to arbitration. The arbitrator
determines facts, applies the law to those facts, and issues an award
149
binding on the parties. Other than confirming the award (subject
150
to the extremely narrow grounds for vacatur), there is nothing left
for an Article III court to do. In the words of Stern quoting Northern
Pipeline (both of which rejected arguments that bankruptcy courts are
adjuncts of Article III courts), “the authority—and the
responsibility—to make an informed, final determination . . .
151
remains with” the arbitrators, not an Article III court.
Thus,
arbitrators are not adjuncts of Article III courts.
Because arbitration under the FAA is not a court-martial, a
territorial court, or an adjunct of an Article III court, it can be
justified under the categorical exceptions approach only in public
152
rights cases.
As noted above, the Court in Stern explained that
public rights cases are those in which the claim at issue derives from a
federal regulatory scheme or in which adjudication of the claim by
153
the non-Article III tribunal is essential to some regulatory objective.
Thus, disputes arising solely under state common law are not public
145. See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
147. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612–13.
148. See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
150. See supra Part I.C.
151. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
152. One could argue that arbitration should be a fifth categorical exception to
Article III, but there is little to support such an argument. See infra notes 194–98 and
accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
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154

rights cases.
To the extent such disputes arise between parties of
155
diverse citizenship, they fall within the coverage of Article III, and
to the extent such disputes also involve interstate commerce,
156
arbitration of them is subject to the FAA. Yet because such disputes
involve only private rights, arbitration of them under the FAA cannot
be justified under the public rights exception.
The only disputes subject to arbitration under the FAA that could
possibly be justified under the public rights exception, then, would
be federal statutory claims. For example, employment discrimination
claims arising under federal antidiscrimination statutes can be
subjected to pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable under
157
the FAA.
While such disputes typically involve the liability of one
private party to another, one could argue that they nevertheless
involve public rights claims such that they need not be decided by an
Article III court under the categorical exceptions approach of
158
Northern Pipeline and Stern.
Recall that Stern, departing somewhat
from Northern Pipeline’s requirement that public rights cases involve
the government as party, held that whether a claim is a public rights
claim depends on whether the claim is “integrally related to

154. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (“Vickie’s counterclaim . . . does not fall within
any of the varied formulations of the public rights exception in this Court’s cases. . . .
The claim is instead one under state common law between two private parties. It
does not depend[] on the will of [C]ongress; Congress has nothing to do with it.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) (“[A] private right for which state law provides the
rule of decision . . . is . . . a claim of the kind assumed to be at the core of matters
normally reserved to Article III courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
156. See supra Part I.A.1.
157. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(holding that an ADEA claim can be subject to compulsory arbitration where neither
the statute’s language nor the legislative history explicitly prohibits the possibility).
158. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures To Resolve
Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 168 (2001) (“The
various employment discrimination statutes involve both ‘private’ and ‘public’ rights.
The specific individuals who file claims under those enactments may believe that they
are asserting wholly ‘private’ rights, but the strong government interest in the
elimination of pernicious discrimination renders the rights created by these laws
‘public.’. . . Under these circumstances, Congress would probably have the right to
assign the adjudication of employment discrimination claims to Article I
administrative procedures rather than to Article III judicial forums.”); Marcia L.
McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39,
73 (2011) (“Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes do not fall
perfectly into the public rights/private rights categories. They involve both.”);
Andrew P. Walsh, Note, Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc.: The “Foreign Laws” Exception to the
ADEA—When a Collective Bargaining Agreement Equals a Law, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
455, 494 (1997) (“Employment discrimination statutes by their very nature concern
‘public rights.’”).
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159

particular federal government action.”
One could potentially
argue that private employment discrimination claims are “integrally
related” to federal regulation of the workplace to ensure equal
employment opportunity, and thus fall within the public rights
160
exception.
To the extent various statutory claims involve public
rights, arbitration of such disputes pursuant to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement made fully enforceable by the FAA may not be
problematic with respect to Article III under the categorical
exception for public rights cases.
Nevertheless, such cases represent only a subset of all Article III
161
disputes potentially subject to the FAA, and fully private claims do
not fall within any of the categorical exceptions. For example, even
assuming that Title VII employment discrimination claims were
public rights claims, and thus that compelling arbitration under the
FAA of a sexual harassment claim would not conflict with Article III,
compelling arbitration of related state law tort claims (such as assault
162
or intentional infliction of emotional distress) would.
Unlike
courts-martial, territorial courts, and adjuncts, the public rights
categorical exception focuses on the dispute, not the body
adjudicating the dispute. Consequently, while a public rights
categorical exception could potentially justify arbitration under the
FAA of some Article III disputes, it does not justify all such
arbitration. The categorical exceptions approach to non-Article III
adjudication (set out in Northern Pipeline and potentially revived in
Stern) thus does not save the FAA.
Even if the Court’s decision in Stern did not revive the categorical
approach, however, and the balancing approach laid out in Schor
remains good law, the FAA does not fare any better. Recall that
under the balancing approach, the three factors to consider in
determining whether a non-Article III body is impermissibly
exercising Article III judicial power are:
159. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
160. One making such an argument might look to Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that
statutorily mandated arbitration of a dispute between two private parties arising
under a federal pesticide registration law did not violate Article III because the claim
at issue “b[ore] many of the characteristics of a ‘public’ right,” and was “an integral
part” of a federal regulatory program.
161. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrates
thousands of disputes each year involving private common law claims such as breach
of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. See Dispute Resolution Statistics,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationandmediation/finradisputeresolution/
additionalresources/statistics (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
162. Assuming diverse parties.
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[1] [T]he extent to which “the essential attributes of judicial
power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of
jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts,
[2] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and
[3] the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
163
requirements of Article III.

With respect to the first prong, as noted above in explaining why
arbitration cannot be considered an adjunct of an Article III court, no
essential attributes of judicial power are reserved to Article III courts
when arbitration of a federal dispute is compelled pursuant to the
164
FAA.
To the contrary, in disputes subject to arbitration, it is
arbitrators, not courts, that “exercise[] the range of jurisdiction and
165
powers normally vested only in Article III courts.”
As explained
above, the jurisdiction of arbitrators is broad, covering federal
statutory claims as well as common law diversity disputes touching on
166
interstate commerce (defined expansively).
This broad range of
disputes that arbitrators can adjudicate stands in stark contrast to the
narrow jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
167
(CFTC) upheld in Schor under the balancing test.
In upholding
adjudication of certain disputes by that non-Article III body, the
Court noted that the CFTC “deals only with a particularized area of
168
law.” In addition, arbitrators also exercise a broad range of powers
normally confined to the judiciary, including summoning witnesses to
169
testify or provide other evidence and issuing a wide range of
170
Because under the FAA, arbitrators,
preliminary and final relief.
not Article III courts, exercise the essential attributes of judicial
power, application of the first prong of the balancing test cuts against
the constitutionality of such arbitration.
The second prong of the balancing test—the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated —addresses the private
163. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
164. Supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
165. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850–57.
168. Id. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“The arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any person
to attend before them . . . as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them
any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in
the case.”).
170. DRAHOZAL, supra note 94, at 393 (“Most arbitration rules grant arbitrators
the authority to award provisional measures.”); HUBER & WESTON, supra note 41, at
374–75 (citing rules of leading arbitration organizations in which “arbitrators are
accorded broad remedial powers”).
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171

rights/public rights issue described above.
Again, while some
statutory claims subject to arbitration may arguably be public rights
claims, and thus amenable to non-Article III adjudication, other
172
disputes subject to arbitration under the FAA are not. The second
prong thus potentially weighs in favor of the appropriateness of
arbitration in resolving some Article III disputes, but not others.
Finally, consideration of the third prong —the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III —seems, like
the first prong, to cut against the consistency of FAA arbitration with
Article III. The purpose behind passage of the FAA was to ensure
173
enforcement of arbitration agreements, and one of the primary
motivations for Congress to make arbitration agreements enforceable
was the perceived cost and efficiency advantages of arbitration over
174
litigation.
Congressional concern over non-enforcement of
purportedly cheap and efficient arbitration agreements, however,
stands in stark contrast to the concerns that drove Congress to
establish the system of non-Article III CFTC adjudication upheld in
Schor. In Schor, the Court noted that in authorizing the CFTC to
adjudicate certain kinds of disputes, Congress’s “primary focus was
on making effective a specific and limited regulatory scheme, not on
175
allocating jurisdiction among federal tribunals.”
The specific and
limited regulatory scheme in Schor was oversight of the “volatile and
esoteric futures trading complex” by the CFTC, an agency that
176
“would be relatively immune” from politics. In contrast, the FAA’s
transfer of dispute resolution from federal courts to arbitration for
reasons of cost and efficiency does not make effective some specific
and limited regulatory regime, but simply allocates jurisdiction
171. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 853 (noting that whether the claim at issue is a private
right, which is “assumed to be at the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to Article III
courts,” while not dispositive, “has significance in [the] Article III analysis”).
172. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
173. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–21 (1985)
(discussing congressional intent to ensure that agreements to arbitrate carried equal
effect to other contracts).
174. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“It is practically appropriate that [the
FAA should be passed] at this time when there is so much agitation against the
costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and
enforceable.”); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The desire to avoid the delay and
expense of litigation persists. The desire grows with time and as delays and expenses
increase.”); supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (discussing “two goals of the Arbitration
Act —enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient and speedy
dispute resolution” (quoting Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 221)).
175. 478 U.S. at 855.
176. Id. at 836.
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among adjudicatory bodies.
Other than application of the second prong to the subset of public
rights disputes, all prongs of the Schor balancing test weigh against
finding the FAA consistent with Article III. Consequently, neither of
the Supreme Court’s approaches, categorical exceptions or
balancing, justifies arbitration under the FAA as a non-Article III
tribunal.
2.

Scholarly approach: Appellate review theory
As James Pfander has pointed out, “[s]cholars have expressed little
enthusiasm for either the Court’s categorical approach or its
177
balancing approach.”
The leading alternative to the Court’s
178
approaches offered by scholars is appellate review theory.
Appellate review theory asserts that the exercise of judicial power
over an Article III dispute by a non-Article III body is constitutional
so long as the non-Article III body’s decisions are subject to
179
sufficiently searching appellate review by an Article III court. One
177. Pfander, supra note 12, at 665 & n.111 (citing Paul M. Bator, The
Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65
IND. L.J. 233, 248–51, 257–58 (1990); Fallon, supra note 10, at 926–29; Richard B.
Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the
Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 101–06 (1988)). Professor Pfander
himself likewise shows little enthusiasm for either the categorical or balancing
approaches. Pfander, supra note 12, at 671 (“In the end, the available models of the
relationship between Article I and Article III all suffer from serious difficulties.”).
178. Pfander, supra note 12, at 666 (noting that “an appellate review theory of
judicial power, in one form or another, has fared best”); see also infra note 179.
Professor Pfander offers what he terms an “inferior tribunals” approach to analyzing
non-Article III tribunals. Pfander, supra note 12, at 650–51. While this approach,
grounded as it is in the Inferior Tribunals Clause of Article I, may offer a more solid
textual foundation than appellate review theory, it is, as noted by Caleb Nelson, more
a supplement to appellate review theory than a substitute for it. See Nelson, supra
note 12, at 616 n.230. In contrast to the scholars endorsing appellate review theory,
Craig Stern endorses the categorical exceptions approach of Northern Pipeline,
although he argues that “exceptions” is a misnomer. Stern, supra note 109, at 1076
(“The text of the Constitution permits courts-martial, territorial courts, executive
adjudication of public rights, and the participation of judicial adjuncts⎯all without
the protection of [Article III’s salary and tenure provisions]. . . . The provenance of
the so-called ‘exceptions’ to Article III rests upon the Constitution, not upon an
unprincipled departure from the Constitution under the guise of historical
necessity.”).
179. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 933 (“The core claim of [appellate review theory]
is that sufficiently searching review of a legislative court’s or administrative agency’s
decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements of article III.”);
Redish, supra note 12, at 227 (“[I]f in every case falling within the judicial power
there exists an opportunity for review in an article III court, it would seem that the
constitutional requirement that the judicial power ‘be vested’ in these courts is fully
satisfied.”); Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at 139 (“[W]e conclude that the
mandate of article III is only satisfied when Congress, in creating a non-article III
tribunal, makes available article III review of that tribunal’s factual and legal
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attractive element of appellate review theory is that it is at least “an
absolute construction” of Article III—a construction that does not
rely on the nature of the claim adjudicated —in contrast to both the
Supreme Court’s categorical approach, which distinguishes between
public and private rights, and its balancing approach, which looks to
180
the origin and importance of the right to be adjudicated.
181
Appellate review theory is based on two premises. First, given the
institutional and doctrinal history of non-Article III bodies, Congress
should have the discretion to authorize the use of such bodies to
182
make initial adjudications of Article III disputes. Second, however,
notwithstanding this history and the importance of non-Article
tribunals, the underlying values of Article III—which include
individual disputants’ interest in impartial adjudication as well as
183
structural interests in maintaining proper separation of powers —
184
must not be forgotten or balanced away. From these two premises,
appellate review theory holds that while disputes ostensibly falling
within the coverage of Article III may, in the first instance, be heard
185
by a non-Article III adjudicator, the decision of the non-Article III
body must be subject to sufficiently searching review by an Article III
court. Specifically, appellate review theory provides that legal
determinations made by the non-Article III body must be subject to
186
independent de novo review by an Article III court, though
determinations.”). For one criticism of appellate review theory, see Troy A.
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV.
747, 772, 777–92 (2010), which explains that “[w]hen viewed in light of the
operation of the bankruptcy courts . . . the appellate review theory advanced by
scholars leave[s] much to be desired.”
180. See Redish, supra note 12, at 226–27 (noting the desirability of an absolute
construction of Article III, such as appellate review theory offers, because the
language of Article III appears to tolerate no exceptions to its requirements). But see
Nelson, supra note 12, at 616–20 (noting that “[i]n academic circles . . . the appellate
review theory of Article III is often perceived as a unitary approach that does not vary
according to the type of legal interests being adjudicated,” but explaining that “[o]n
closer inspection, [the theory] does not actually transcend the public/private
distinction”).
181. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 917–18. Professor Fallon is generally credited
with providing the “leading account” of appellate review theory. See, e.g., Nelson,
supra note 12, at 614–15; Pfander, supra note 12, at 666. For a brief discussion of
some of the minor variations among scholars endorsing appellate review theory, see
Nelson, supra note 12, at 615 n.230.
182. Fallon, supra note 10, at 917.
183. See id. at 937–43 (describing Article III values, including “fairness to litigants”
and separation of powers); infra Part III.B.1.
184. Fallon, supra note 10, at 917–18.
185. See id. at 949.
186. See id. at 982–83; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at 142–44; see also
Redish, supra note 12, at 227–28 (calling for “nondeferential review” of agency
interpretations of law by Article III courts).
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determinations of fact may be subject only to a more deferential
inquiry into whether the factual findings are supported by substantial
187
evidence.
Unfortunately, appellate review theory does not fare any better
than the categorical exceptions and balancing test in resolving the
tension between Article III and the FAA. While appellate review
theory requires sufficiently searching Article III review of decisions
by non-Article III tribunals, as discussed above, judicial review of
188
arbitral awards under the FAA is extremely limited. The statutory
grounds set forth in the FAA allow for review essentially only of the
arbitrators’ conduct, not of the substance of their factual or legal
189
determinations. Further, to the extent any non-statutory grounds
of review by Article III courts, such as “manifest disregard,” survive
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, such review falls short of
the de novo review of legal determinations required by appellate
190
review theory.
Consequently, adjudication of Article III disputes
by arbitrators under the FAA cannot be justified under appellate
191
review theory.

187. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 989; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 177, at
143–44; see also Redish, supra note 12, at 227 (questioning whether review of factual
findings under a substantial evidence test provides for meaningful appellate review,
but conceding that such limited review may be appropriate).
188. Supra Part I.C.
189. Supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
190. Supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text. Arbitrators routinely make
determinations of law. Even at the time of the Federal Arbitration Act’s enactment it
was clear that arbitrators make such determinations. See Joint Hearings on Arbitration,
supra note 47, at 27 (statement of Alexander Rose, representing the Arbitration
Society of America) (“I never knew of an arbitration where questions of law were not
to be passed upon . . . .”).
191. Professor Rutledge has proposed a “modified appellate review theory,” which
he asserts would justify arbitration under the FAA. Under this modified appellate
review theory, the fact that arbitration is a voluntary undertaking lessens the need for
plenary Article III review. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1216. According to Professor
Rutledge, this lessened need allows for Article III review at some standard less than
de novo, which he argues is satisfied by review for “manifest disregard.” Id. at 1226
(“[U]nder modified appellate review theory, the manifest disregard doctrine
arguably supplies the necessary degree of federal appellate review. The voluntariness
of the undertaking justifies a reduced role for federal courts. At the same time, the
manifest disregard doctrine preserves a limited role for federal courts vindicating the
Article III values still present in an arbitration scheme.”). There are two problems
with this analysis. First, in many cases it is questionable whether arbitration—even
pursuant to a purported agreement—is truly voluntary and thus justifying under
modified appellate review theory a lesser standard of review. See generally supra Part
I.B. Second, Professor Rutledge’s reliance on manifest disregard to supply such
lesser review likely does not survive Hall Street. See Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1227
n.155 (noting that Hall Street was decided just before his article went to press).
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III. REMEDYING THE PROBLEM
Given that private arbitration under the FAA is not consistent with
192
193
Article III under any of the judicial or scholarly approaches to
non-Article III adjudication, the question becomes whether there is
any other way to resolve the tension. One possibility would be to
create a categorical exception to Article III for arbitration. Another
potential fix would be to amend the FAA to permit more searching
judicial review of arbitration awards. As discussed below, however,
neither of these solutions is ultimately satisfactory.
A. A Categorical Exception? More Searching Review?
One could argue that arbitration under the FAA should simply be
considered an additional exception to Article III literalism, and thus
justified under the categorical exceptions approach of Northern
Pipeline and Stern. Yet, while the current exceptions for courtsmartial, territorial courts, and public rights cases are premised on
194
historical precedent, no such historical precedent exists to support
195
196
a categorical exception for arbitration. As discussed above, prior
to enactment of the FAA, disputes brought in court were not typically
sent to arbitration, regardless of any arbitration agreement between
the parties.
Courts generally would not enforce arbitration
agreements and, in fact, it was this traditional judicial hostility to
197
arbitration that the FAA was intended to overcome.
Thus, there
seems to be little to support a historically-based categorical exception
198
for arbitration.
192. See supra Part II.B.1.
193. See supra Part II.B.2.
194. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[I]n my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless
there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.” (emphasis omitted));
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (noting that the exceptions recognize “historically . . . exceptional”
circumstances and that Article III “must be interpreted in light of the historical
context”). Recall that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline refused
to call adjuncts an “exception” to Article III. Adjuncts were justified not on
historical precedent, but because the “essential attributes of judicial power” were
retained by Article III courts in such cases.
See supra notes 124–31 and
accompanying text.
195. But see Geraldine A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1931) (“[R]eference of
maritime controversies to arbitration ha[s] long been common practice.” (quoting
Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 122 (1924))), aff’d sub nom. Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932))).
196. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.
198. Another potential downside of justifying arbitration as a new categorical
exception to Article III is the risk that goes with choosing a side in an ongoing Article
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Another option for reconciling the FAA with Article III would be to
authorize Article III courts to perform de novo review over legal
determinations made by arbitrators. While such a change would
justify FAA arbitration under the appellate review theory proposed by
199
scholars, there are two main problems with this option. First, in
light of Hall Street’s holding that the narrow statutory grounds in the
200
FAA for modification or vacatur of arbitral awards are exclusive,
granting Article III courts de novo review power would require a
201
Relying on Congress to remedy the
legislative change to the act.
statute may not be the most effective way to solve the problem. As
Amanda Frost has noted, “[a]lthough Congress always has the power
to amend legislation, Congress is busy and has limited resources, and
so more often than not would leave even problematic legislation in
202
place.”
Second, even if Congress had the time and resources to
amend the FAA to provide for de novo review by Article III courts, it
is not at all clear that such an amendment is desirable. While
requiring sufficient appellate review of arbitral awards may make the
act consistent with Article III, it would tend to undermine one of the
primary motivations behind the FAA, namely to provide for quick,
203
inexpensive, informal resolution of disputes.
Any expansion of
appellate review beyond the limited review originally called for by the
204
FAA undermines that purpose.

III debate. Should the Supreme Court ultimately reject the categorical exceptions
approach to non-Article III adjudication generally (as it appeared to before Stern
undermined Schor), a new justification for arbitration would be needed.
199. See supra Part II.B.2. In addition, such a change could potentially justify FAA
arbitration under the balancing approach and the adjunct categorical exception
because allowing de novo review would arguably allow Article III courts to retain
“essential attributes of the judicial power,” the basis for the adjunct exception, see
supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text, and the first prong of the balancing
approach, see supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text; see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
201. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
202. Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2007).
203. See supra notes 44, 173–74 and accompanying text.
204. See Hall St., 552 U.S. at 588 (noting that the FAA judicial review sections
provide “just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway” and suggesting that a broader review standard would
“open[] the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can render
informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming
judicial review process and bring arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration
process” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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B. Waiver Theory
Having explained that arbitration is fundamentally inconsistent
with Article III under the leading judicial and scholarly approaches to
adjudication by non-Article III bodies, and having determined that
the two possible remedies to this inconsistency are ultimately
unsatisfactory, this Article does not go on to conclude that simply
205
striking down the FAA as unconstitutional is the answer. Instead, it
asks whether disputants may waive the FAA’s Article III problem and
have their federal dispute resolved by an arbitrator nonetheless. As
discussed below, whether disputants may waive Article III problems
depends on the nature of the interests protected by Article III.
1.

Individual and structural concerns
In Schor, the Supreme Court explained that Article III’s
requirement of an independent adjudicator with life tenure and
salary protections safeguards two separate interests: “Article III, § 1,
not only preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and
independent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial power
of the United States, but also serves as an inseparable element of the
206
constitutional system of checks and balances.”
The Court further held that to the extent Article III protects the
personal rights of disputants to adjudication by a life-tenured and
207
salary-protected adjudicator, those rights may be waived.
On the
other hand, to the extent Article III’s salary and tenure protections
safeguard against encroachment on the judiciary by the legislative or
executive branches, and against aggrandizement of those other
branches at the judiciary’s expense, such concerns cannot be waived
208
by the disputants.
205. Such a result is unlikely to occur in any event. See Reuben, supra note 23, at
978 n.123 (“[I]t is implausible to imagine the Supreme Court striking down the
[FAA] at this point, given the body of law that has developed under it and the
widespread national and international reliance on its validity.”).
206. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609
(2011) (noting that Article III “serve[s] two related purposes,” protecting
individuals and protecting each branch of government); Fallon, supra note 10, at
937–43 (describing Article III values, including “fairness to litigants,” and
separation of powers).
207. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49 (“[A]s a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an
impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other
personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal
matters must be tried.”).
208. Id. at 850–51 (“To the extent that this structural principal is implicated in a
given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty . . . .
When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot
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The idea that Article III creates a personal right waivable by
individual disputants is not without its critics. In Schor itself, Justice
Brennan dissented, arguing that “[b]ecause the individual and
structural interests served by Article III are coextensive, I do not
believe that a litigant may ever waive his right to an Article III
209
Professor
tribunal where one is constitutionally required.”
Rutledge similarly argues that Article III problems are not waivable by
disputants because nothing in the text, structure, or history of Article
210
III suggests that it confers a personal right.
While it is true that
Article III does not expressly state that its tenure and salary provisions
establish an individual right in disputants to an independent
decision-maker with these protections, it was not a stretch for the
Schor majority to find such a personal right. To read Article III as not
conferring a personal right to a life-tenured and salary-protected
adjudicator would be to render the requirement a meaningless
formalism. Protection of the judiciary from the other branches alone
cannot explain the judicial insulation provisions of Article III. As
Rebecca Brown has noted, “separation of powers is not an end in
211
itself.”
The tenure and salary provisions of Article III protect
212
individuals, and it was thus not unreasonable for the majority in
Schor to read such provisions as conferring personal, individual
213
rights.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton argued that the structural
provisions of the Constitution protected individual rights such that a
214
separate bill of rights would be superfluous.
be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties
cannot be expected to protect.”).
209. Id. at 867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1197–99.
211. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1516 (1991).
212. See id. at 1538 (arguing that the structural provisions of the Constitution,
including separation of powers, provided protection of individual rights); see also
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Constitutional Structure of the Courts of the United States
Territories: The Case of American Samoa, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 379, 432 (1991) (“The core
of article III is the independence of the judiciary. The self-evident purpose of
judicial independence is to provide a fair and impartial tribunal for litigants.”).
213. One interesting question that arises from a finding that Article III creates a
personal, individual right to a life-tenured and salary-protected adjudicator for
federal disputes is whether corporate disputants also enjoy this constitutional right.
See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future
of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 909–14 (2011) (explaining the
“broken jurisprudence of corporate constitutional rights”).
214. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 16, at 581 (Alexander Hamilton) (urging
ratification of the Constitution even absent an express bill of rights, noting that “the
constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF
RIGHTS”); see also Brown, supra note 211, at 1515 (“[O]nce the body of the
Constitution was essentially complete, some opposed the addition of a bill of
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Assuming, then, that Schor properly read Article III as conferring
an individual right to a life-tenured and salary-protected judge, such a
right is waivable. To the extent Article III also protects the judiciary
more generally from encroachment by the other branches, however,
such structural protections are not waivable by individual disputants
in any particular case. Where such structural concerns are not
implicated, however, parties remain free to waive their personal right
to an Article III judge. A primary example of such a situation is
consent jurisdiction of magistrate judges. Federal magistrate judges
215
do not enjoy Article III’s tenure and salary protections.
Nevertheless, under the Federal Magistrates Act, parties to a federal
case can consent to have a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings
216
in the matter and enter a final order. Absent consent of the parties,
it is unlikely that complete adjudication of the dispute and entry of
judgment by a non-Article III magistrate would pass constitutional
217
muster.
Nevertheless, consent of the parties cures any
218
constitutional defect. Parties may waive their right to an Article III
forum in these circumstances because adjudication by a magistrate
judge does not implicate any structural separation of powers
concerns. In an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, then-Judge
Kennedy noted that magistrate adjudication by consent does not
present “the paradigmatic separation of powers case, where the
integrity of one branch is threatened by another,” and that, among
other things, magistrates are not directly dependent on the legislative
or executive branches because the selection and retention of
219
magistrates is the responsibility of Article III judges.
rights on the ground that the structure of the government, with its own selflimiting principles, would make any express protection of individual liberties
superfluous . . . .”).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2006) (providing that federal magistrate judges are
appointed by United States District Court judges for eight-year terms).
216. Id. § 636(c)(1).
217. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725
F.2d 537, 542 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (“A mandatory provision for trial of an
unrestricted class of civil cases by a magistrate and not by Article III judges would
violate the constitutional rights of the litigants.”).
218. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, the circuit
courts have uniformly held that party consent to adjudication of civil disputes by
magistrates cures any constitutional defects. See A Constitutional Analysis of
Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 252 n.3 (1993) (citing cases). Indeed,
the legitimacy of magistrates’ consent jurisdiction is so well established that one
court has held that challenging it was “abusive of the judicial process.” D.L. Auld
Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
219. Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544–45; see also 28 U.S.C. § 631 (stating that the
responsibility for appointment and removal of magistrates belongs to federal district
judges).
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Like consent jurisdiction of magistrate judges, private arbitration
under the FAA does not implicate the non-waivable structural
concerns of Article III. While the FAA represents a diminishment of
the Article III judiciary by removing from it the adjudication of some
subset of cases it would otherwise decide, there is no corresponding
aggrandizement of the legislative or executive branches. When
Article III disputes are removed from the judiciary and resolved by
either administrative or legislative courts, those disputes are resolved
by adjudicators controlled by the other branches of the federal
220
government.
In contrast, when Article III disputes are removed
from the judiciary pursuant to the FAA, they are resolved by
adjudicators who remain as independent of the executive and
legislative branches as they are of the judicial branch. Indeed,
arbitration arguably diminishes the power of all three branches, given
the executive and legislative branches’ roles in selecting Article III
221
judges.
In any event, the FAA’s diminishment of the federal
judiciary without a corresponding aggrandizement of another branch
of government fails to implicate the non-waivable structural concerns
222
of Article III.
In arguing that arbitration nonetheless implicates non-waivable
Article III structural concerns even absent aggrandizement of the
other branches, Professor Rutledge asserts that Congress is (1)
220. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that “[a]n action [including removal,
suspension, or reduction in pay] may be taken against an administrative law
judge . . . by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed ”);
26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (“Judges of the Tax Court may be removed by the President,
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office . . . .”).
221. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (setting forth the role of the President to
appoint judges with the advice and consent of the Senate).
222. Adjudication of federal disputes by state courts provides another example of
diminishment of the federal judiciary without corresponding aggrandizement of the
other federal branches. Where parties file in state court and fail to remove to federal
court cases that could otherwise be brought in federal court, they essentially waive
their right to Article III adjudication, and state court adjudication of Article III
disputes does not implicate structural separation of powers concerns. See N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 n.15 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (“Congress has no control over state-court judges; accordingly the
principle of separation of powers is not threatened by leaving the adjudication of
federal disputes to such judges.”); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial
Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297,
304 (1981) (“Because untenured state court judges are not appointed, confirmed,
paid or removed by Congress, no separation of powers principle is violated by
permitting Congress to leave application of its statutes to these judges.”). Clearly,
state court adjudication of federal disputes does not violate Article III, although
one could argue that state courts are a unique non-Article III tribunal that the
framers intended would resolve federal disputes. See generally supra notes 118–19
and accompanying text.
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stripping the courts of their power to interpret the meaning of
federal law (and depriving the public of valuable precedent), and (2)
commandeering the courts when it requires them to enforce
223
arbitration awards.
With respect to the first point, while Congress
may be reducing the opportunity for federal courts to develop
precedent by allowing parties to avoid Article III adjudication (and
thereby reducing the number of disputes presented to Article III
courts), the FAA in no way “strip[s] federal courts of the power to
interpret the meaning of federal law and erect[s] a system by which
others, namely arbitrators, can define it,” as argued by Professor
224
Rutledge.
The FAA has no impact on how Article III courts
interpret federal law and establish precedent in those cases that come
225
before them, nor do arbitrators define federal law.
Unless all
disputants voluntarily agree to arbitrate every Article III dispute,
thereby removing every private case from Article III adjudication —a
highly unlikely scenario—Article III courts retain the opportunity to
interpret law and establish precedent, with neither Congress nor
226
Further, to the extent
arbitrators affecting how they do so.
disputants comply with arbitration agreements without resorting to
the FAA for enforcement, they are denying Article III courts the
opportunity to interpret law and establish precedent in their case —
the concerns identified by Professor Rutledge —without any
congressional action at all (other than to the extent that the FAA
casts a shadow over disputants’ decision to comply with an arbitration
agreement). Such arbitration without FAA enforcement, while still

223. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201. Professor Sternlight makes a claim similar
to Professor Rutledge’s first argument when she states that arbitration “threatens
the existence of the judicial branch by privatizing a substantial number of claims
that would otherwise have been heard by Article III courts.” Sternlight, supra note
20, at 79.
224. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201.
225. See Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: Destruction of the Common Law,
2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11–12 (2003) (“[A]rbitration lacks the ability to formulate policy or
change existing law.”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002) (“Where cases are
decided by courts of law, in reported decisions, a substantial change of direction by
the decision-makers will be a matter of public record. Since arbitration decisions do
not have this public quality, neither a tendency to follow past decisions nor a resolve
to depart from them would be a matter of public record. So neither kind of law—the
precedent-respecting or the precedent-rejecting—is thereby created.”).
226. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31–32 (1991)
(rejecting the argument that allowing arbitration of ADEA claims would result in “a
stifling of the development of the law” because “judicial decisions addressing ADEA
claims will continue to be issued because it is unlikely that all or even most ADEA
claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements”).
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the exercise of judicial power by a non-Article III body, clearly raises
no structural separation of powers concerns, suggesting that simply
denying courts opportunities to interpret law and make precedent is
not sufficient.
With respect to Professor Rutledge’s second point, it is just not
clear how Congress can be said to be “commandeering” the federal
judiciary through the FAA’s requirement that courts confirm
arbitration awards. Professor Rutledge analogizes to Printz v. United
228
States where the Court held that Congress could not commandeer
state officials to administer federal gun control regulations under the
229
Brady Act. While Professor Rutledge acknowledges that Printz dealt
with federal-state relations, not federal inter-branch separation of
powers issues, he fails to explain either how exactly the Printz anticommandeering principle translates to such horizontal separation of
powers issues or how the FAA’s requirement that courts confirm
arbitration awards commandeers the federal judiciary in the same
way that Congress commandeered state law enforcement officers
through the Brady Act. It does not violate separation of powers
principles for Congress to dictate to courts the situations in which
they should render judgment for one side or another (such as where
one side has obtained an award from an arbitrator). Indeed, that is
230
precisely the proper role of the legislature vis-à-vis the judiciary.
Regardless, at the end of the day, aggrandizement of other branches
seems ultimately to be the fundamental separation of powers
231
concern, which, as Professor Rutledge acknowledges, is simply
232
lacking with respect to arbitration under the FAA. Indeed, in Schor
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
229. Id. at 933; Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1201 (stating that Printz demonstrates
“separation of powers principles generally prohibit the commandeering of another
branch of government”).
230. See A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 475–76 (2000)
(“Courts exist to resolve disputes. Implicit in that role is the requirement that judges
interpret and enforce the law . . . and that function requires judges to follow
commands issued by others . . . . Therefore, being commandeered is inherent in
being a judge . . . .”).
231. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1127, 1147–48 (2000) (noting that despite surface disagreement, “courts and
commentators agree on the following objective: The system of separation of powers
is intended to prevent a single governmental institution from possessing and
exercising too much power”).
232. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 1200. Arguably the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Pacemaker authored by then-Judge Kennedy could be read to suggest that erosion of
the judiciary alone (even absent corresponding aggrandizement of the other
branches) can implicate non-waivable structural concerns. In Pacemaker, the Ninth
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itself, the Supreme Court noted that “Congress may encourage
parties to . . . resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions
233
on the separation of powers.”
Simply stated, the FAA implicates only the personal rights aspect
of Article III and not any structural separation of powers concerns.
As a result, disputants can waive their right to have an Article III
judge adjudicate their dispute in favor of resolution by a non234
Article III arbitrator.
2.

Implications for FAA consent jurisprudence
Acknowledging that the FAA is fundamentally inconsistent with
Article III and that waiver theory offers the only feasible justification
for compelling arbitration of Article III disputes raises to
constitutional importance the question of disputants’ consent to
arbitration. As explained above, under current FAA jurisprudence,
consent to arbitration is generally measured by a contract law
235
objective manifestation of intent standard. Yet it is not at all clear
that this is the proper standard for determining whether disputants

Circuit held that consenting to adjudication by a magistrate was consistent with
Article III. In so holding, the court noted that in addition to magistrates not being
subject to the control of either the legislative or executive branches, Article III courts
retained some control over magistrate consent jurisdiction. Pacemaker Diagnostic
Clinic of Am., Inc v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc). Nevertheless, while such Article III control over magistrates certainly
supported the court’s finding that non-waivable structural separation of powers
concerns were not implicated, it is not clear that such additional control is necessary
where, as in the case of adjudication by both magistrates and arbitrators, other
branches’ power is not aggrandized. Indeed, adjudication of Article III disputes by
state court judges (who are similarly not answerable to Congress or the Executive)
does not implicate Article III structural separation of powers concerns despite a lack
of the kinds of control by Article III courts noted in Pacemaker. See supra note 219
and accompanying text.
233. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
234. Some have argued that once a dispute has been brought before a court, it
should be resolved by the court, and the parties therefore may not voluntarily
remove the dispute from the court. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). This argument is premised on a belief that “the purpose of
adjudication is not the resolution of a dispute, not to produce peace, but rather
justice . . . .” Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1276–77
(2009) (explaining Against Settlement). Carrie Menkel-Meadow has characterized the
debate over the primary purpose of adjudication as the question of who “owns” any
particular dispute, the disputants themselves, or the community generally. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2679–80 (1995). Addressing this
question in detail is beyond the scope of this Article. Clearly, however, the idea that
disputants have and may waive an individual right to have an Article III judge resolve
their dispute takes as a fundamental premise that the disputants themselves “own”
their dispute.
235. See supra Part I.B.

PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

248

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2013 1:35 PM

[Vol. 62:201
236

have waived their constitutional right to an Article III forum. While
the Supreme Court has made clear that the standard for determining
waiver of constitutional rights in the criminal context is a subjective
237
one requiring knowing and voluntary waiver, it has not expressly
extended that requirement to waivers of constitutional rights in the
civil context.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the
standards are the same. For example, in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
238
Co., Overmyer contracted with Frick to install a refrigeration system
239
in one of Overmyer’s warehouses. Following various renegotiations
of payment terms, Overmyer ultimately signed a note containing a
confession of judgment clause allowing Frick to have a civil judgment
entered against it without notice or hearing in the event the company
240
defaulted on its payment obligations.
This is sometimes called a
241
cognovit clause. In upholding the validity of a judgment obtained
pursuant to the cognovit clause, the Supreme Court held that
Overmyer had “voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” waived its
constitutional due process rights when it agreed to the confession of
242
judgment provision.
While careful to note that it was only
assuming, not deciding, that the same standards governing waivers of
constitutional rights in the criminal context likewise applied in the
civil context, the Court suggested that in a future case where a waiver
was not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made, it might not be
243
Indeed, in a companion case decided the same day as
upheld.
Overmyer, the Court affirmed a district court opinion refusing to
enforce cognovit clauses in consumer financing agreements absent a
236. The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed what level of consent is
required to waive the individual constitutional right to an Article III forum. In Schor,
the Court noted that a party had effectively waived his right to have an Article III
court adjudicate a counterclaim when he participated in a non-Article III agency
proceeding “with full knowledge” that the agency would exercise jurisdiction over
his counterclaim. Schor, 478 U.S. at 850. Whether “full knowledge” is a minimum
requirement or whether some level of consent less than full knowledge would be
sufficient to waive Article III rights, however, is not clear from the opinion.
237. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (noting that “[a]
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right” and requiring an “intelligent and competent” waiver).
238. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
239. Id. at 179.
240. Id. at 180–81.
241. Id. at 176.
242. Id. at 187.
243. Id. at 185, 187–88.

PERLSTADT.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

1/10/2013 1:35 PM

ARTICLE III AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

249

showing that debtors had “intentionally, understandingly, and
voluntarily” waived their constitutional due process rights at the time
244
they signed the agreements. Similarly, less than four months later,
245
the Court in Fuentes v. Shevin found that consumers had not waived
their constitutional right to pre-seizure process where they signed
agreements allowing sellers to repossess merchandise in the event the
246
consumers defaulted on payment.
In that case, the Court noted
that the facts were “a far cry from those of Overmyer,” pointing out
that:
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the
parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power.
The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales
contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as
247
a waiver of constitutional rights.

While the Court in Fuentes ultimately did not rely on
248
involuntariness or unintelligence of the waiver, and neither Fuentes
nor Overmyer expressly transferred the subjective waiver standards
249
from the criminal context to the civil context, circuit courts
addressing the issue have generally adopted the strong implication of
those cases that waiver of civil constitutional rights likewise requires
250
knowing and voluntary consent.
244. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 196–200 (1972).
245. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
246. Id. at 95–96.
247. Id. at 95.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 94–95.
250. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192,
205 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional rights . . . may be contractually waived where
the facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the party
foregoing its rights has done so of its own volition, with full understanding of the
consequences of its waiver.” (quoting Erie Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d
1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988))), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3197 (U.S. Sept. 21,
2012) (No. 12-373); Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 969
(9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a waiver of both civil and criminal
constitutional rights must be knowing and voluntary); Echavarria v. Pitts, 641 F.3d 92,
94 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting, in civil cases, that a “waiver of constitutional rights is
not effective unless the right is intentionally and knowingly relinquished” (quoting
Davis Oil Co. v. Mills, 873 F.2d 774, 787 (5th Cir. 1989))); Bayo v. Napolitano, 593
F.3d 495, 505 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that waiver of due process rights to
a deportation hearing “must be done both knowingly and voluntarily”); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing as controlling
the Supreme Court’s application of the identical civil and criminal waiver standard of
“voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly” made (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94–95)),
abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Burke
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Although courts thus seem to endorse a subjective knowing and
voluntary standard for determining waiver of constitutional rights —
even in the civil context —as discussed above, they apply only an
251
objective, contract-level standard of consent to arbitration.
Recognizing that arbitration can be justified only as a waiver of
Article III rights exposes the tension in this state of affairs. This
mismatch suggests that standards of consent to arbitration must be
raised to the constitutional knowing and voluntary standard in order
to align FAA jurisprudence with constitutional waiver
252
jurisprudence.
In addition, the Supreme Court has long
recognized a presumption against the waiver of constitutional
253
Thus, given that arbitration under the FAA is a waiver of
rights.
constitutional rights, determining whether parties have consented to
arbitration must also be subject to a presumption against arbitration.
While an interpretation of the Constitution requiring knowing and
voluntary waiver of constitutional rights necessarily trumps any
statutory interpretation of the FAA requiring only a contract-level
standard of consent, it is nevertheless worth pointing out that
knowing and voluntary consent to arbitration is not inconsistent with
the text of the FAA. Defenders of contract-level waiver standards
point to the language of section 2 of the FAA, which states that an
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
254
of any contract.”
While section 2 requires that arbitration
agreements be treated as enforceable as any other kind of
County, 149 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The contractual waiver of a
constitutional right must be a knowing waiver [and] must be voluntarily given . . . .”);
Doe v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that Second Circuit
precedent “suggests that the waiver of a fundamental right in the context of civil
cases must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”). While the Eighth
Circuit does not appear to expressly endorse a knowing and voluntary standard, it
reads Fuentes as requiring at least that contractual waivers of civil constitutional
rights “be clear and unambiguous.” In re Workers’ Comp. Refund, 46 F.3d 813,
819 (8th Cir. 1995).
251. Supra Part I.B.
252. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L.
REV. 478, 545 (1981) (“[T]he contract standard cannot be used to justify those
waivers that involve constitutional rights since such rights necessarily take
precedence over the contract policy of honoring private agreements.”).
253. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 682 (1999); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94 n.31; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel.
Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
254. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d
1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses,
and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2004, at 167, 170.
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agreement, a necessary prerequisite to enforcing an arbitration
agreement is the existence of such an agreement. Yet enforceability
256
and existence of an arbitration agreement are separate concepts,
and section 2 addresses only the former. Determination of the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate is covered in section 4 of the
FAA, which requires that before a court compels arbitration, it must
be “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is
257
not in issue.”
Unlike the enforceability determination under
section 2, however, the determination under section 4 —whether an
agreement actually has been made — does not reference contract law.
Indeed, section 4 does not specify the standards by which a court is to
satisfy itself that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Thus, requiring
knowing and voluntary consent to arbitration before compelling
258
arbitration is not inconsistent with the text of the FAA.
In sum, this Article’s thesis—that arbitration under the FAA can
only be justified as a waiver of Article III rights—suggests that
consent to arbitration must be determined under the standards used
to determine waiver of civil constitutional rights generally, namely a
subjective knowing and voluntary standard with a presumption
against waiver. Before concluding, however, it is important to point
out two caveats. The first caveat is that this Article does not attempt
to lay out in detail how a subjective consent standard with a
presumption against arbitration would be applied in practice. On
the one hand, it seems likely that practices such as unilateral
adoption of arbitration agreements by employers or consumer service
259
providers would not pass muster under the standard suggested
here. On the other hand, agreements to arbitrate an existing dispute
260
would seem to raise few, if any, questions of consent, and perhaps a
255. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–46
(2011).
256. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006).
257. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 3 similarly requires that before a court may stay
litigation in favor of arbitration, it must be satisfied that an arbitration agreement
exists covering the dispute. Id. § 3.
258. Nor is section 2 rendered a nullity by requiring knowing and voluntary
consent to arbitration. Once a court determines that parties have knowingly and
voluntarily consented to arbitration, there are still issues of validity, revocability, and
enforceability not related to assent to which section 2 still applies (such as illegality
or lack of consideration, for example).
259. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law
(with a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 199
(1998) (noting that parties signing post-dispute arbitration agreements are (1) aware
that they are obligating themselves to arbitrate because dispute resolution is the only
subject matter of such agreements, and (2) likely advised by lawyers).
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signed post-dispute arbitration agreement would be enough to
establish subjective consent to arbitration. In between those poles lie
cases involving issues such as the circumstances in which non-parties
should be bound to arbitration agreements and application of the
261
separability rule. Under the standard suggested here, disputants in
such cases would be presumed not to have consented to arbitration,
but the question of what kinds of evidence would be required to
rebut that presumption and establish subjective consent is not
answered here, and perhaps best left to case-by-case evolution of FAA
jurisprudence.
The second caveat to keep in mind is that despite the strong
implications of Overmyer and Fuentes, the Supreme Court has not
expressly held that the standard for waiving constitutional rights in
the civil context is a subjective knowing and voluntary standard.
Indeed, Stephen Ware has cautioned against overreliance on
Overmyer and Fuentes and argued that the Supreme Court is in fact
more likely, ultimately, to adopt a contract-law standard for waiver of
constitutional rights in the civil context than a knowing and voluntary
262
consent standard.
Were the Court to do so, this Article’s
conclusion that consent to arbitration must be measured under a
subjective knowing and voluntary standard would change, but the
fundamental thesis of the Article would not. The fact that only waiver
theory can justify arbitration under the FAA and that, consequently,
consent to arbitration must be measured by the standards used to
determine waiver of civil constitutional rights generally would not be
affected. To the extent the law on waiver of civil constitutional rights
were to coalesce around a contract-law standard, only the
implications on current FAA consent jurisprudence of this Article’s
thesis—not the thesis itself —would change.
CONCLUSION
Article III of the Constitution allocates judicial power to lifetenured, salary-protected judges. Arbitrators adjudicating disputes
that would otherwise be heard in federal court are exercising judicial
power without such protections, which suggests that the FAA is
inconsistent with a literal reading of Article III. While Article III
literalism has been rejected by both courts and scholars, the FAA
does not fall comfortably within any of the judicial or scholarly
261. See supra notes 76–91 and accompanying text.
262. Ware, supra note 254, at 182–88, 205.
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approaches justifying resolution of Article III disputes by non-Article
III tribunals. Unless arbitration is determined to be an express
exception to Article III’s mandate, which this Article has argued is
not warranted, the FAA cannot be justified under the Supreme
Court’s categorical exceptions approach to non-Article III
adjudication. Nor does the Court’s balancing test —to the extent it
still remains viable post-Stern —justify allowing non-Article III
arbitrators to resolve Article III disputes. Finally, given the extremely
limited judicial review of arbitration awards —and that any statutory
change to the review standards is both unlikely and unwise—the FAA
cannot be justified under appellate review theory, the leading
scholarly approach to non-Article III adjudication generally.
In light of the fact that the FAA is fundamentally inconsistent with
Article III, waiver theory offers the only possible salvation for
arbitration. While waiver theory is not new, this article shores up its
theoretical foundation by (1) firmly establishing that the FAA is
indeed fundamentally inconsistent with Article III, thus filling a gap
in current waiver theory, and (2) showing that private arbitration
under the FAA does not implicate unwaivable structural separation of
powers concerns.
In addition, this article points out that
acknowledging that arbitration can only be justified as a waiver of
Article III rights requires courts to determine whether parties have
agreed to arbitration under the standards used to evaluate waiver of
civil constitutional rights generally. This represents a fundamental
change to current FAA jurisprudence. Specifically, while courts
currently determine whether parties have consented to arbitration
using contract-law objective standards of consent, given the
constitutional mandate that judicial power over Article III disputes
not be exercised by arbitrators lacking life tenure and salary
protections, courts should instead apply a subjective knowing and
voluntary standard.

